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In the twenty-first century, technological innovation is 
driving geopolitical, economic and military competi-
tion. The US and China are leading the field. The risk of 
an emerging global bipolar technology environment is 
looming; one that could force third countries to come 
down on the side of the US or China. Europe is lagging 
behind in the global tech race and faces an uphill bat-
tle in its attempts to remain competitive. 
The findings in this study show that Europe has quite 
a way to go if it wants to become as competitive as 
the US or China. In particular, European stakehold-
ers from the private and public sector as well as civ-
il society are worried about the EU’s overdependence 
on foreign-owned technology providers. These con-
cerns are particularly acute in the realms where Eu-
rope does not have a strong indigenous industrial 
base, such as in cloud computing (76 percent express 
concerns), artificial intelligence (68 percent), and to a 
lesser extent by 5G mobile technology (54 percent). 
It makes a difference whether the EU is reliant on the 
US or China. The majority of stakeholders surveyed 
say that the EU relies most on the US for key tech-
nologies including artificial intelligence (80 percent) 
and cloud computing (93 percent) but also block-
chain, high performance computing, and the inter-
net of things (IoT). Only in 5G and mobile networks 
did respondents identify a larger dependency on Chi-
na (65 percent). A slim majority (54 percent) believe 
the EU should chart an independent path between the 
US and China while 46 percent believe the EU should 
move closer to the US.
According to the stakeholders surveyed, the EU’s lack 
of first-mover advantage and absence of dominant 
home-grown tech players (such as Google, Microsoft, 
Amazon, and others) are the central obstacles to its ca-
pacity to act. But the EU does have levers it can use to 
turn the tides in its favor. When surveyed on the instru-
ments available to Europe, stakeholders ranked the 
top four as: access to the EU market; global regulatory 
power; standard-setting; and data access and control. 
There are five key technology areas that are set to 
define and shape the future of Europe’s capacity to 
act. These are:  artificial intelligence (AI), cloud com-
puting, semiconductors, 5G and mobile equipment, 
and quantum technology. We have assessed Europe’s 
strengths and deficits in each of these areas. 
Artificial intelligence: The EU has stepped up its 
efforts to develop, deploy, and promote trust-
worthy AI. But there are three major hindrances 
preventing European competitiveness: Europe’s 
inability to commercialize its AI development; the 
lack of venture capital investment for AI start-
ups; and the tension between need for data sets to 
train AI models and the EU’s strong data protec-
tion rules that make access to data sets difficult. 
The EU should further codify its values for inter-
national export. Together with its member states, 
the EU should also create large-scale public data 
pools usable for both AI research and AI applica-
tion, because when the public sector leads in the 
adoption of AI-services, it accelerates AI take-up 
in other areas.
Cloud computing: Europe’s gap with the US and 
China on cloud computing is even more striking 
than in the field of AI. However, the EU is aware of 
this. With ambitious projects such as the Europe-
an Alliance for Industrial Data and Cloud and GA-
IA-X, Europe aims to open up its cloud market. To 
succeed in this, Europe will have to learn from past 
mistakes and focus on driving down the costs of 
European cloud computing while driving up its re-
liability. Start-ups and small and medium-sized en-
terprises (SMEs) active in cloud computing should 
be supported through interoperability rules, while 
rules to protect citizens’ data should be enforced.
Semiconductors: Creating independent semicon-
ductor capacity will be no easy task for the EU. And 
funds alone will not suffice to make European com-
panies competitive. The task is rather to special-
ize in fields where the EU has incumbent strengths, 
such as chips for automotive, AI, and IoT devices. 
Instead of trying to compete directly with the US 
and the other world leader, Taiwan, the EU should 
instead focus on preserving and supporting local 
manufacturing capabilities as well as promoting 
open standards in chip design like RISC-V.
5G and mobile networks: Europe is somewhat bet-
ter positioned on 5G and mobile networks com-
pared to other areas. That partially comes down 
to the fact that there are no major US players in 
this space, but also because Europe’s two leading 
companies – Ericsson and Nokia – have the size 
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Ycounterparts. The EU, via its innovation programs, 
should support intensive research in the field of 6G 
to maintain its strong position so that it is ready 
when the next development in mobile connectivi-
ty comes around. In addition, the EU and its mem-
ber states should promote open standards for mo-
bile communication networks.
Quantum computing: This technology is still in the 
early stages of development and its practical appli-
cations today are limited. But by 2030, it is likely to 
be a vital technology with projected benefit across 
a range of areas including communication, indus-
try, and AI, among others. Germany and France are 
already pushing forward in this sector, but Europe 
more broadly must position itself as a frontrunner 
now to gain first-mover advantage and avoid fall-
ing behind, like it has in the semiconductor indus-
try. The EU also has an opportunity to leverage its 
incumbent research strengths to successfully bring 
this technology to market. This means fostering in-
novation and public-private partnerships to devel-
op the potential of quantum computing.
When it comes to the geopolitics of technology, 
the EU and its member states should make a prior-
ity of maintaining a globally interoperable internet 
and encouraging global innovation. Europeans do 
not always appreciate just how greatly they bene-
fit from both of these things. To make this a reali-
ty, the EU should take the lead in the development 
of international coalitions with like-minded actors 
in standard-setting bodies and informal groupings 
for technology governance. And it should work out 
a strategy that fuels development, connectivity, 
and regional empowerment the Global South – a 
part of the world that Europe has, so far, not paid 
enough attention to when it comes to technology. 
Following the examples of the US and China, the EU 
must acknowledge the role that military and de-
fense modernization can play in advancing its in-
novation industrial base.
If the EU wishes to assert its standards across all 
five technology areas, it has to take major steps 
to become competitive. Merely relying on regula-
tion and leveraging access to the European mar-
ket will fall short in the long term. That much is 
now clear. The EU needs to innovate, and if it fails 
in this, it will lose its capacity to act on the global 
stage. Furthermore, if the EU wants to be compet-
itive it needs to complete the Digital Single Mar-
ket and alter the culture behind it. Europe needs 
to reinvigorate its high-skilled workforce through 
flexible working conditions, education, and immi-
gration, and remove blockers to the use of inno-
vative technologies. A deeper culture of risk toler-
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INTRODUCTION
Technological leadership has become a central dimension of geopolitical 
power. In this development, the primary front in the emerging tech power ri-
valry is between the US (United States of America) and China (People’s Re-
public of China). The European Union (EU) has fallen behind and needs to 
catch-up. The stakes in this race are high and will have an impact on econom-
ic competition, national security and broader values-based notions of political 
order. This study sheds light on Europe’s approach to technological mastery. 
 
The European Commission’s President Ursula von der Leyen has made EU 
tech leadership a top priority of her presidency and, beginning in Decem-
ber 2019, she has focused on boosting the EU’s role as a geopolitical actor by 
launching a multitude of initiatives, strategies and legislative proposals. Across 
European capitals, political leaders have been calling for ‘digital sovereign-
ty’. This became a rallying cry, which served as a guiding principle for the EU’s 
digital policy during the 2020 German Presidency of the Council of the EU.
This study looks into the progress of the EU and its member states across select-
ed technological fields and their global entanglements with other nations and 
technology actors. First, five trends – currently defined by the interplay between 
digitalization and international politics – will be examined to provide the neces-
sary background and showcase the urgency of action needed. Second, the con-
cept of ‘capacity to act’ will be outlined and positioned in the context of the EU’s 
contemporary tech policy discourse. Third, a Stakeholder Snapshot will provide 
quantitative insights into how key stakeholders perceive the geopolitical dimen-
sions of the European tech-landscape. This data includes perceptions of the EU’s 
key dependencies and the instruments at hand for strengthening European re-
silience and leadership in technology. Fourth, a selection of crucial technology 
areas that will shape the future will be assessed. Among these are artificial in-
telligence, cloud computing, semiconductors, 5G and mobile connectivity, and 
quantum computing. Each of the sections will include a qualitative assessment of 
the state of play and general policy approach, while also providing specific pol-
icy recommendations. Finally, some general conclusions will be drawn on how 
the EU and its member states can enhance their technological competitiveness.
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 Key Trends  
Defining the 
Geopolitical 
Tech Space  
in 2021
Five major trends currently define the world’s technological 
and political environment. These are the trends that moti-
vate the EU towards action and demonstrate the urgency 
with which the bloc needs to act. The five trends that stand 
out in particular include:
1. Technology’s key role in ensuring geopolitical,  
economic, and military competitiveness; 
2. The gradual trend of US-China digital decoupling; 
3. Digital authoritarianism; 
4. New technological dependencies and vulnerabilities 
brought on by COVID-19; 
5. New renaissance in tech-industrial policy.
All of these trends are interlinked with the great power 
rivalry between the US and China, which is increasingly de-
fined by the race for technological leadership.
The overarching question for European policy makers is 
how the EU and its member states fit into this great pow-
er rivalry and how they can credibly compete for leader-
ship and mastery in digital technologies between these two 
great powers. 
1   Reuters Staff, “China’s Xi pushes advanced technology for military”, Reuters, (March 13, 2017:):  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-defence/chinas-xi-pushes-advanced-technology-for-military-idUSKBN16K02V>  (accessed November 10, 2020).
2  ”The 100 largest companies in the world by market capitalization in 2020”, Statista, (April 06,2021):   
https://www.statista.com/statistics/263264/top-companies-in-the-world-by-market-capitalization (accessed April 06, 2021).
 1.1   TECHNOLOGY’S KEY ROLE IN 
GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITIVENESS
Technological leadership is fast becoming one of the key 
areas of geopolitical, economic, and military competition. 
The many use cases, or general-purpose character of sev-
eral key technologies, is blurring the lines between previ-
ously distinct domains, such as economy and security. For 
example, advances in image recognition algorithms that can 
be used for commercial purposes, might also be used for 
mass surveillance or for identifying objects on a battlefield. 
Quantum technology that can be used for domestic man-
ufacturing, might also be employed to detect stealth air-
crafts, or to break encrypted or otherwise secure networks. 
Governments and companies that are able to achieve mas-
tery of key enabling technologies and adopt them more 
easily, will have enormous economic and political power le-
vers at their disposal. Actors that are unable to keep pace, 
will be forced to expose themselves by depending on other 
countries for those essential technologies. 
Given the growing importance of technology for ensuring 
economic and military competitiveness, it should come as 
no surprise that the emerging great power competition be-
tween the US and China is increasingly defined by the quest 
for technological leadership. The Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) has rolled out a range of strategic initiatives aimed at 
enhancing technological capabilities (see Fig. 1), while Chi-
na’s President Xi Jinping has made it clear that science and 
technology leadership are “key to military upgrading”.1
Due to the importance of the private sector for develop-
ing cutting-edge technologies, countries need to develop 
and nurture a thriving innovation sector at home. Today, big 
tech companies in the US and China are among the world’s 
best capitalized businesses. For context, seven of the ten 
largest companies in the world by market capitalization 
are in the tech space and out of those, five are US-based 
and two are from China.2 These tech companies have be-
come engines of growth, productivity and, most important-
ly, innovation. Be it IBM and Google in quantum computing; 
Amazon and Microsoft in cloud computing; or Baidu in ma-
chine-learning, tech companies have become the locus of 
cutting-edge innovation at a level previously reserved for 
top universities and government R&D programs.
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The gap between European technology companies and 
American and Chinese technology giants is significant. Eu-
ropean companies count for less than 4 percent market 
capitalization among the world’s 70 largest digital com-
panies, compared to the US, whose companies represent 
73 percent and China’s, which represent 18 percent.3 Ven-
ture capital, which is the lifeblood for new and innovative 
tech companies, has surged in Europe in 2019 and is up 40 
3 The Economist, “The Brussels effect, cont”, (February 20, 2020).
4  Kim Darrah, ”European tech startups break records with $34bn in venture capital funding this year“, Sifted, (April 06, 2021):  
https://sifted.eu/articles/european-tech-atomico-startups (accessed April 06, 2021).
5  “Venture Pulse Q4 2019”, KPMG, (January 15, 2020): https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2020/01/venture-pulse-q4-2019-asia.pdf (accessed April 06, 2021); 
Pete Settles, “Venture Capital Investment in U.S. in 2019 Hits $136.5 Billion”, KPMG, (January 15, 2020): https://home.kpmg/us/en/home/media/press-releases/2020/01/
venture-capital-investment-in-us-in-2019-hits-136-5-billion-second-highest-on-record-kpmg-report.html#:~:text=Venture%20Capital%20Investment%20in%20
U.S.,Highest%20on%20Record%3A%20KPMG%20Report (accessed April 06, 2021).
percent since 2018, attracting €29 billion of capital to Eu-
ropean tech companies.4 But that is still considerably less 
than US and Chinese venture capital firms put on the ta-
ble, as US based companies raised €114 billion and Chinese 
based firms more than €34 billion.5 The low level of invest-
ment in indigenous European technology has created the 
conditions for non-European acquisitions, such as Google’s 
purchase of UK-based AI company DeepMind.
TABLE 1:  MAJOR STATE-DRIVEN TECH INITIATIVES IN CHINA 
NAME PURPOSE/OBJECTIVE TIMEFRAME
Made in China  
2025 
A ten-year industrial development plan funded with approx. €252 billion  
will transform ten core industries into globally competitive, innovative,  
and digital industries. The plan was updated in 2017 with a stronger focus  
on self-reliance for core emerging technologies.1
2015–2025
Internet Plus A subset of the Made in China 2025 plan to fully integrate conventional industries 
and connected services, particularly in manufacturing, finance, government, health 
and agriculture. 
2015–2020
Digital Silk Road 
(DSR) 
The technology and ICT infrastructure component of China’s outbound Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI), initially announced in 2015.2 It aims to expand 5G networks, 
data centers, smart cities, satellite collaboration, and over-the-top (OTT) service 
providers, especially mobile payments, e-commerce, and gaming.3 At least 16  
countries have signed a memorandum of understanding on the Digital Silk Road.4
Since 2015
14th Five-year Plan 
on National  
Scientific and Tech-
nological Innovation
By focusing on scientific and technological self-reliance, Beijing “aims to create  
closer ties between academia and industry, and to improve the evaluation of the 
results of this collaboration.”5 However, the document lacks explicit growth targets.
2021–2025
New Generation  
AI Development 
Plan
“[B]y 2030, China’s AI theories, technologies, and applications should achieve 
world-leading levels, making China the world’s primary AI innovation center,  
achieving visible results in intelligent economy and intelligent society applications, 
and laying an important foundation for becoming a leading innovation-style nation 




An as yet unreleased 15-year strategy under formulation by the Standardization  
Administration of China to shape and export indigenous industrial and technical 
standards and play a larger, concerted role in international bodies like the  
International Standards Organization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical  
Commission (IEC), and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU).7
Until 2035
1  The respective US-Dollar denominated amounts that were found in the literature were divided by the foreign exchange reference rate of  
the Euro/US-Dollar pair of 1.1888 on April 9, 2021 to display their value in Euro.
2  Robert Greene and Paul Triolo, “Will China Control the Global Internet Via its Digital Silk Road?”, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace (May 08, 2020) 
3  Paul Triolo et al., “The Digital Silk Road: Expanding China’s Digital Footprint,” Eurasia Group (April 2020) 
4 Steven Feldstein, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on China’s Strategic Aims in Africa,” May 8, 2020
5  Smriti Mallapaty, “China’s five-year plan focuses on scientific self-reliance,” nature, (March 11, 2021)
6 Graham Webster et al., “Full Translation: China’s ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan”, New America, (August, 2017):
7  Alexander Chipman Cody, “What is the China Standards 2035 Plan and How Will it Impact Emerging Industries?”, China Briefing, (July 2, 2020)
Sources:
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1.2  THE GRADUAL TREND OF  
US-CHINA DIGITAL DECOUPLING
As the US and China try to outpace each other by devel-
oping and adopting new technologies, they are also in the 
process of cutting their reliance on each others’ technol-
ogies. This is the so-called digital or technological ‘decou-
pling’. When taken to its logical conclusion, decoupling 
could lead to two separate tech stacks evolving: one led by 
the US and one by China. Each tech stack would have its 
own supply chain network, innovation system, standards, 
and protocols. At some point the EU and its member states 
might have to ask whether they want to set up their own 
third stack. And if the answer is no, then the EU may have 
to decide which tech stack – and by proxy which coun-
try – to align with. Even though the emergence of two 
perfectly distinct systems is not realistic in the foresee-
able future, the trend towards decoupling raises questions 
about Europe’s strategic orientation.
Export controls and sanctions imposed by the US on Chi-
na have also increased the extent of decoupling. For an ex-
ample of how these sanctions and controls play out, we only 
need to look at the case of Chinese telco Huawei. Google’s 
discovery of data security vulnerabilities when people in-
stalled Google apps or a Google OS on Huawei handsets re-
sulted in Google blacklisting the company. Subsequently, 
the US government banned companies from doing business 
or collaborating with the company. In response, Huawei 
is now developing its own HarmonyOS. Furthermore, US 
chipmakers were forced to cut off supplies to Chinese com-
panies, after the US government added them to the Entity 
List (see Table 2).  
6   Beijing is considered a forerunner in this respect by establishing the so-called ‘Great Firewall of China’ – largest and most cultivated online censorship system – and even 
exporting these national notions of internet governance to other countries in the world. However, since other countries such as Russia also drives these developments, the 
term of ‘cyberbalkanization’ is also referring to this.
Beijing – motivated by such restrictions and its own strate-
gic aspirations for end-to-end control – is gradually striving 
for digital self-reliance through investments in its own do-
mestic tech-industries and by reducing its dependence on 
other suppliers. China has taken the logic of control so far 
as to seek other elements of digital decoupling in the field 
of internet governance by exploring the idea of cutting the 
country off from the World Wide Web and setting up “na-
tional internet sovereignty”. Something that already exists 
in China in the form of the “Great Firewall”, which signifi-
cantly reduces information permeability.6
The US reasons for decoupling span questions of econom-
ic competitiveness and national security. The perception in 
Washington, shared by the Biden Administration, the for-
mer Trump Administration, and large bipartisan majorities 
in Congress, is that China has taken advantage of the open 
American market and innovation cooperation while simulta-
neously using the opportunity to steal intellectual property 
and engage in forced technology transfers, all as a means to 
develop China’s own innovation industrial base. Washington 
also has concerns about the security risk posed by Chinese 
technologies – in particular the use of commercial products 
for espionage and disruption – due to the strong link be-
tween the Chinese tech industry and the CCP and military.  
1.3 DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM 
Technology is becoming a vehicle for exporting and en-
forcing ideologies. While technologies may have once 
been seen as emissaries of digital democratization, they 
are increasingly used to enforce digital authoritarianism 
Source: “Tech regulation: The Brussels effect, continued.”, The Economist (February 20, 2020).
Source: Debora Revoltella et al., “Adoption of digital technologies by firms in 
Europe and the US: Evidence from the EIB Investment Survey” (March 18, 2020).
FIGURE 1:  MARKET CAPITALIZATION OF  
TOP 70 TECH COMPANIES
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Source: Baker McKenzie, “Sanctions & Export Controls Update”: https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/category/bis/entity-list (accessed March 1, 2021).
with “[n]ew technologies…enabl(ing) high levels of socie-
tal control at a reasonable cost.”7 The tools for effective 
digital authoritarianism already exist, including AI-enabled 
surveillance systems (e.g. facial/gait recognition technol-
ogy), spyware on mobile phones, and internet censorship, 
to name a few.
7   Wright and, Nicholas, “How Artificial Intelligence Will Reshape the Global Order. The Coming Competition Between Digital Authoritarianism and Liberal Democracy,”  
Foreign Policy, 2018.  
Countries setting an example by using those technologies 
can inspire others. Not only like-minded autocrats, but al-
so vulnerable democracies who could set norms for the use 
of invasive technologies. To see this approach in action, we 
need only look at China’s “Great Firewall” and the example it 
sets. Countries such as Vietnam and Thailand have already 
TABLE 2:  SELECTED US GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AGAINST CHINESE TECHNOLOGIES 
DATE KEY US MARKET ACCESS ACTIONS AIMED AT CHINESE TECHNOLOGY
May 2019 Huawei and 68 non-US affiliates added to the Entity List.
June 2019 Institute of Computing Technology added to the Entity List.
August 2019 46 additional Huawei-affiliated entities added to the Entity List.
October 2019 28 Chinese companies, including world-class AI start-ups such as SenseTime, Megvii, and Yitu,  
added to the Entity List for their involvement in human rights violations.
November 2019 The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) launches an investigation  
into the TikTok (ByteDance Technology) acquisition of Musical.ly.
March 2020 Following two separate CFIUS investigations, Chinese companies are forced to divest from earlier  
acquisitions of the hotel management systems software company, StayNTouch, and the gay men’s  
dating app, Grindr, citing concerns about Chinese government access to sensitive data. 
May 2020 Semiconductor firms using American chipmaking equipment, intellectual property,  
or design software, need a special license before delivering to Huawei.
June 2020 Limited exemptions granted for certain Huawei technologies in the context  
of international 5G standard-setting.
August 2020 11 companies added to the Entity List based on their role in human rights abuses in Xinjiang  
(including forced labor, massive detention and surveillance, and involuntary biometric data collection).
38 Huawei affiliates added to the Entity List. The US withdraws exemptions and expands  
the foreign-produced direct product (FPDP) rule to restrict Huawei non-US affiliates access  
to semiconductors produced using US technology and design.
The White House issues an Executive Order aimed at effectively banning the use of Tiktok  
and WeChat in the US.
November 2020 The White House releases an Executive Order banning US investment in Chinese companies  
on the so-called “Pentagon List” for ties to the Chinese military.
December 2020 77 additional multinationals added to the Entity List including Chinese semiconductor company,  
SMIC, and Drone Manufacturer, DJI, due to ties to the Chinese military.
January 2021 US bans transactions with Chinese electronic payment apps (Alipay, QQ Wallet, WeChat Pay). 
 
The Pentagon places nine companies on the Entity List for ties to the Chinese military  
including mobile phone maker Xiaomi and aerospace company Comac.
February 2021 The Biden Administration seeks a stay in litigation over US market access for Tiktok and WeChat,  
pending a review of US approaches to Chinese social media. 
March 2021 The US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) designates Huawei, ZTE,  
Hytera Communications, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology, and Dahua Technology  
as posing an “unacceptable risk” to national security.
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debated copying China’s model. Chinese experts are also 
reported to have supported government censors in Sri Lan-
ka and to have supplied surveillance or censorship equip-
ment to Ethiopia, Iran, Malaysia, Russia, Venezuela, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe, among others.8 As technology-driven au-
thoritarian models of governance become more apparent in 
fragile democracies, the concept of liberal democracy will 
find itself under new pressure.9
Since the very beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, the dis-
cussion surrounding digital authoritarianism has gained 
new impetus as several states – especially in Southeast Asia 
– have employed new technologies such as AI surveillance 
to detect whether citizens are wearing face-masks or not, 
and social tracing apps to enforce quarantine orders. Crit-
ics see the use of these technologies in aid of public health 
as a gateway to normalizing broader and more authoritari-
an uses in the future. Even in European states such as Ger-
many, France, the United Kingdom or the US, a debate has 
flared up concerning the use of technologies to mitigate the 
spread of the COVID-19 virus and to strike the right bal-
ance between using tech for good and honoring each citi-
zen’s right to have control over their personal data.
1.4  TECHNOLOGY DEPENDENCIES 
AND VULNERABILITIES
The COVID-19 crisis has helped propel technology adoption 
forward around the world. Cloud-based services, in partic-
ular, have gained rapidly in usage and popularity. But this 
has revealed four key dependencies and vulnerabilities that 
Europe now faces::
1. Chinese market: The growth of the Chinese econo-
my during the COVID-19 crisis has amplified European 
– particularly German – dependencies on the Chinese 
market for IoT and Industry 4.0 exports. In 2020, amid 
Chinese GDP growth and a recession in Europe and the 
US, China overtook the US as the EU’s most important 
trade partner. This makes key European countries like 
Germany dependent on China and adds sensitive ques-
tions about economic relations to any decisions about 
potentially banning Chinese 5G vendors, for example. 
2. US platforms and cloud providers: Widespread tech 
adoption throughout Europe during the COVID-19 cri-
8  Tarun Chhabra, “The China challenge, democracy, and U.S. grand strategy”, Brookings (February 2019), pp. 5-6: 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/FP_20190311_us_grand_strategy_chhabra.pdf  (accessed November 10, 2020).
9  Besides the direct impact of exporting technologies for undemocratic practices, China also exerts its economic and technological influence  
over third countries via its infrastructure projects. By deploying its own IT-Stack, the recipient countries can become structurally dependent.
10  Import Substitution Industrialization is a macroeconomic strategy of replacing imports that satisfy a domestic demand with domestically produced goods  
and services to support local industry while reducing dependencies on foreign enterprises.
11  Max J. Zenglein and Anna Holzmann, “Evolving Made in China 2025. China’s industrial policy in the quest for global tech leadership,” MERICS, (July 2019):  
https://merics.org/de/studie/made-china-2025 (accessed March 17, 2021).
sis has intensified reliance on US web services and cloud 
hosting providers. 
3. Third-country supply chains: COVID-19 revealed how 
brittle (tech) supply chains can be as Europe has faced 
bottlenecks on a range of products from semiconduc-
tors to vaccines. 
4. Cyber-security: The COVID-19 crisis has opened up 
new vulnerabilities for state-backed active measures, 
mis-/disinformation, IP theft, and cyber-spying. One 
example was the hack of the European Medicines Agen-
cy, which resulted in vaccines data being leaked. New 
IT-based threat vectors impacting European democracy, 
prosperity and potential for physical harm.  
Taken together, these trends show potential vulnerabilities 
in Europe’s technological ecosystem that must be mitigated. 
1.5  A NEW RENAISSANCE IN 
TECH-INDUSTRIAL POLICY
The growing worldwide trend toward tech industrial policy 
is unmistakable. In many ways, China has been a forerunner 
in the resurgence of this trend. China’s technological devel-
opment efforts have drawn greater global attention since 
2015 when it launched its Made In China 2025 plan, which 
was updated in 2017 to put greater emphasis on creating 
domestic autonomy in key emerging technology areas. Chi-
na’s use of industrial targets and import substitution indus-
trialization10 to boost its indigenous technology companies, 
helps to incubate domestic enterprises and provide fertile 
ground for them to scale up. Other factors bolstering Chi-
na’s domestic tech sector include generous state-backed 
investments in the form of both subsidies and state financ-
ing, procurement structures that preference state-favored 
companies, forced joint ventures, and sharing of technolo-
gy IP gathered through state-backed industrial espionage 
with copy-cat companies at home. All of these factors help 
to create a codependent technology ecosystem for China, 
in which the CCP is the undisputed senior partner.11 
For the US in recent years, the story has been different. 
The US was heavily reliant on the private sector to push its 
technology industry forward. But now the US is also pre-
paring more government-focused support for its innovation 
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industrial base. American tech industrial policy is driven by 
a sense of national mission, linked to national security and 
seen through the lens of the US-China great power con-
flict. The US is now eyeing an increase in public spending 
through both defense and civilian channels to maintain its 
leadership in key emerging technologies.12 The Biden ad-
ministration is currently putting aside €252 billion for the 
development of emerging technologies including AI, 5G, 6G 
and electric vehicles as elements of the president’s Build 
Back Better recovery plan.13
Europe has also gotten serious about having a more inter-
ventionist industrial policy. In 2019, France and Germany 
began thinking about what a more serious approach might 
look like. They issued a 14-point Franco-German Manifes-
to on European Industrial Policy in which they laid out Eu-
rope’s 2030 outlook in stark terms: “The choice is simple 
when it comes to industrial policy: unite our forces or allow 
our industrial base and capacity to gradually disappear.”14 
France and Germany outlined specific focus areas, includ-
ing massive industrial investment, changes to Europe’s reg-
ulatory framework, and new measures to protect Europe’s 
industrial base. This document pointed favorably to new pol-
icy developments around Important Projects of Common Eu-
ropean Interest (IPCEI) that allow for greater state aid to be 
deployed and ensuring public procurement access and trade 
policy operates in service of strategic autonomy. Finally, it al-
so emphasized the need for greater competitiveness of Eu-
ropean enterprises and championed more active screening 
of foreign investment. Other initiatives such as the cloud and 
data infrastructure project GAIA-X, which was initiated by 
the German and French governments and designed to de-
velop common requirements for a European data infrastruc-
ture, are heading in a similar direction.
The COVID-19 crisis and the vulnerabilities it exposed have 
pushed Europe to rethink EU-level industrial policy, includ-
ing in key technology areas. The EU will allocate 20 percent 
of its Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF) to digitaliza-
tion and technology investments. Embryonic cooperation 
on five new IPCEIs is already underway on mobile network 
12  Aaron Boyd, “White House Strategy Names 20 Emerging Technologies Crucial to National Security,” Nextgov, (October 15, 2020):  
https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2020/10/white-house-strategy-names-20-emerging-technologies-crucial-national-security/169293  (accessed March 1, 2021). 
13  Joe Biden, “THE BIDEN PLAN TO ENSURE THE FUTURE IS “MADE IN ALL OF AMERICA” BY ALL OF AMERICA’S WORKERS”:  
https://joebiden.com/made-in-america (accessed March 1, 2021). 
14  BMWi and Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances, “A Franco-German Manifesto for a European industrial policy fit for the 21st Century”, (February 2, 2019):  
https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/F/franco-german-manifesto-for-a-european-industrial-policy.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 (accessed March 1, 2021).
15  Debora Revoltella et al., “Adoption of digital technologies by firms in Europe and the US: Evidence from the EIB Investment Survey”, (March 18, 2020):  
https://voxeu.org/article/adoption-digital-technologies-firms-europe-and-us (accessed April 21, 2021).
16  Isabel Skierka, „Öffentliche Anhörung zum Thema IT-Sicherheit von Hard- und Software als Voraussetzung für digitale Souveränität“ [“Public hearing on IT security of 
hardware and software as a prerequisite for digital sovereignty“], (December 10, 2019):  
https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/672536/b2b63aeeaffe54e40f8c62571cc628c4/Stellungnahme-Skierka-data.pdf (accessed November 10, 2020); 
Adam Satariano, Matina Stevis-Gridneff, “Big Tech’s Toughest Opponent Says She’s Just Getting Started”, New York Times, (November 19, 2019):  
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/19/technology/tech-regulator-europe.html (accessed November 10, 2020).
17  BITKOM, “Digitale Souveränität” (2015): https://www.bitkom.org/sites/default/files/file/import/BITKOM-Position-Digitale-Souveraenitaet1.pdf (accessed March 01, 2021).
equipment, semiconductors, cloud and data innovations, 
hydrogen power, and batteries. And the European Commis-
sion has drafted its so-called “Digital Compass 2030” – an 
action plan for digital competitiveness – with concrete tech 
development targets and a monitoring process for the next 
nine years.15 These efforts are complemented by multilayer 
initiatives at the national and regional levels. Germany, for 
instance, has ambitious industrial R&D plans, investing €2 
billion in quantum computing, €5 billion in AI and €2 bil-
lion in 5G. Industrial policy initiatives are also taking place 
at the regional level, for instance in Baden-Württemberg’s 
Cyber Valley, Europe’s largest AI consortium, and Bavaria’s 
Quantum Valley. Generally, Europe’s tech industrial agenda 
is ambitious and heavily informed by geopolitical circum-
stances. Questions remain, however, as to how the EU can 
translate its objectives into effective action and to what ex-
tent it will enlist like-minded democracies in its efforts.
1.6  FROM “DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY” 
TO CAPACITY TO ACT
The EU must find new ways to assert itself technologically 
amid the fierce competition between the US and China. The 
push for digital or technological sovereignty or a “European 
third way” are buzzwords often heard thrown around. The 
prevalence of these buzzwords signals a deep desire and 
strategic need for technological autonomy. But the question 
of how the EU can achieve that goal remains unanswered. 
The term digital sovereignty refers to the concept of 
self-determination and independent decision-making in the 
digital space.16 Nevertheless, the term itself is used so often 
that it is has lost much of its meaning. Consequently, digi-
tal or technological sovereignty is sometimes mistaken for 
digital or technological autarky – an idea that fails to con-
sider the level of globalization and inter-connectedness in 
today’s supply chains, in particular regarding technologies.17 
And while sovereignty in a strict sense might make sense in 
the analog   world, it has significant limitations in the digital 
space, due to the borderless nature of the internet. 
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The call for a “European third way” brings with it other mis-
conceptions.18 One interpretation concerns the EU’s distinct 
regulatory and ethical emphasis on developing technologies. 
In this way, EU tech would focus on Europe’s human-cen-
tred or value-oriented approach with regard to technol-
ogy to differentiate it from the US, which is considered 
more “hands-off” and profit maximizing, and China, which 
is state-driven and oriented toward social control. Another 
view builds on the concept of a third European tech stack or 
sealed-off supply chain that eliminates third-party depen-
dencies. Those notions have recently been brought forward 
in light of the US-Chinese trend towards decoupling and the 
danger of the EU having to align with one great power or the 
other in these uncertain times. 
Both interpretations have their limitations. The hu-
man-centered approach is based on the EU’s regulatory 
power but neglects the industrial and capabilities side. The 
idea of a European IT stack can be reduced to just describ-
ing a push for technological import substitution industrial-
ization (ISI) or even autarky. 
Against this backdrop, the following study puts forward the 
concept of the EU’s “capacity to act in the technological 
realm” – at least as an interpretation of “digital sovereignty” 
- in order to describe the EU’s prospects and opportunities 
in the digital age. 
18    Melissa Heikila, Steven Overly, “China wants to dominate AI. The US and Europe need each other to tame it.“, (March 02, 2021):  
https://www.politico.eu/article/china-wants-to-dominate-ai-the-us-and-europe-need-each-other-to-tame-it/> (accessed April 06, 2021). 
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2.1  A 2021 SNAPSHOT OF 
STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS 
ABOUT EUROPE’S CAPACITY TO 
ACT IN THE GLOBAL TECH RACE 
To gauge perceptions of Europe’s access to and control of 
key technologies, over 2,500 key experts working on Eu-
ropean technology and digital policy in government, 
industry, think tanks, academia, parliaments, and civil so-
ciety were asked to participate in a survey, key results 
of which are presented here. The selection of poten-
tial participants was based on expertise in the Europe-
an tech landscape and familiarity with the issues at hand. 
One hundred and twenty-six people participated. Re-
spondents hailed primarily from Europe, with stakehold-
ers from Berlin and Brussels heavily represented.  The 
survey was conducted between January 12 and Feb-
ruary 5, 2021 and all responses were fully anonymous. 
FIGURE 3:  I BELIEVE THE EUROPEAN UNION IS TOO  
DEPENDENT ON EXTERNAL ACTORS IN THE FIELD OF:  
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FIGURE 4:  ON WHICH ACTOR DO YOU THINK THE EU IS MOST DEPENDENT ON FOR EACH TECHNOLOGY AREA?  
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2.2  TAKING STOCK OF EUROPE’S    
TECHNOLOGY DEPENDENCIES 
The survey first attempted to establish a topography of Eu-
rope’s perceived dependencies across seven technology ar-
eas mentioned in the EU’s 2020 Digital Strategy.19 Three 
trends stood out:
1. The perception among participants that the EU’s depen-
dencies are most pronounced in cloud computing (76 
percent “agree” or “strongly agree”) and artificial intel-
ligence (68 percent), followed to a lesser extent 5G mo-
bile technology (54 percent). 
2. Stakeholders remain largely neutral on the question of 
over-dependencies in blockchain technology, high per-
formance computing, and quantum technologies. Each 
of the three have been less present in Europe’s politi-
cal discourse around the geopolitics of technology, al-
though that is slowly changing. 
3. Participants demonstrated the greatest confidence in 
Europe’s IoT performance. But even here, approximate-
ly one third of respondents either agreed or strongly 
agreed that Europe is too reliant on external actors. 
 
When drilling down into the EU technology dependencies, 
the survey showed that the EU is perceived to depend most 
on the US compared to any other state, including China. 
This is particularly true in cloud computing (93 percent see 
the EU as dependent on the US) and artificial intelligence 
(80 percent). On blockchain, high performance computing 
(HPC) and IoT, the US was seen as the primary source of de-
pendence. Only in 5G and mobile networks did respondents 
identify a larger dependency on China (65 percent). 
Respondents were asked to provide a baseline assessment 
of these seven emerging technology areas according to the 
same three-tiered framework that was used for assess-
ing US technological standing in the October 2020 White 
House National Strategy for Emerging and Critical Te-
chogies.20 Respondents could rate the EU as a “technolo-
gy leader” in which independent, world-leader capabilities 
should be achieved; a “technology peer” where capabilities 
are linked to interdependence; or “risk management”, where 
dependencies on external actors could lead to strategic and 
geo-economic vulnerabilities. 
19  European Commission, Technology that works for people, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/content/technology-works-people (accessed 10 April, 2021). 
20   White House National Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies, (October 15, 2020): https://nps.edu/documents/115559645/121916825/2020+Dist+A+EOPOTUS+ 
National+Strategy+for+ Critical+%26+Emerging+Tech+Oct+2020.pdf/1543be15-a2ae-3629-7a45-aabdecaedb84?t=1602805142602 (accessed April 11, 2021) 
For most technologies, a plurality of respondents perceived 
the EU as a “technology peer” when assessed against other 
technology powers. This reflects some degree of confidence 
in Europe’s innovation industrial base. In cloud computing 
(67 percent) and 5G/mobile networks (44.4 percent) more 
respondents saw the EU in the “risk management catego-
ry”. But a significant number also perceived Europe to be 
in a “risk management” position on other technology areas, 
including artificial intelligence, blockchain, HPC, and even 
IoT – a finding that indicates an acute awareness of the 
risky position the EU is in. Europe is not seen as a leader in 
any critical technology area, although 5G/mobile network 
equipment (20 percent) and IoT (16 percent) had the highest 
level of respondents classify Europe as a technology leader. 
These results indicate a level of precariousness in the EU’s 
2021 baseline position in key technology areas.
2.3  EUROPE’S STANDING IN THE FIVE 
ENABLING TECHNOLOGY AREAS 
When starting to focus on how the EU should prioritize, the 
survey narrows focuses on the five key enabling technol-
ogy areas identified as significant for Europe’s innovation 
industrial base and capacity to act independently: artifi-
FIGURE 5:  HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE EUROPEAN 
UNION’S OVERALL POSITION IN THE FOLLOWING  
CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES?  (FIGURES IN %)
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cial intelligence, cloud computing, 5G and mobile network 
equipment, and quantum technologies. In all these areas, 
the sense of exposure is great. A majority of respondents 
assess all five as important for Europe’s capacity to act, with 
artificial intelligence (75 percent rate it as important or very 
important) and 5G and mobile networks (73 percent as im-
portant or very important), as particularly acute. The enor-
mity of the challenge of addressing the EU’s dependencies 
is also daunting, particularly in the areas of artificial intelli-
gence (56.8 percent rate it as difficult or very difficult), cloud 
computing, semiconductors, and quantum technology (each 
rated difficult or very difficult by 49 percent of participants). 
In 2021, the United States is seen by stakeholders as the 
global leader in four of the five technologies. In AI, 60 per-
cent of respondents named the US as the global leader; in 
semiconductors, 43.5 percent; in quantum technologies, 
57.7 percent; and in cloud computing, an overwhelming 95 
percent perceived the US as the dominant country. Only in 
5G and mobile networks was China perceived as the global 
leader by 72.5 percent of respondents. 
The picture shifts markedly eastward when asked to assess 
key technologies in 2030. In two of the five key technology 
areas, participants expect China to overtake the US: in arti-
ficial intelligence (55 percent) and semiconductors (47 per-
cent). China is expected to continue its leadership in 5G and 
mobile network equipment although its leadership is ex-
pected to shrink to 63.8 percent from 2021 to 2030. The US 
is expected to maintain technological leadership in cloud 
computing (66.9 percent agree or strongly agree) and quan-
tum technologies (63 percent agree or strongly agree) in 
2030. Europe is not expected to become a global leader in 
any of the five key technology areas, although the percent-
age of those expecting greater European tech leadership in-
creases across all five technologies between 2021 and 2030.
FIGURE 6:  HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE FOLLOWING CRITICAL 
TECHNOLOGY AREAS BY DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE FOR THE 
EUROPEAN UNION’S INNOVATION INDUSTRIAL BASE AND 
CAPACITY TO ACT INDEPENDENTLY?  
FROM LEAST (1) TO MOST IMPORTANT (5); FIGURES IN %
FIGURE 7:  HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE FOLLOWING CRITICAL 
TECHNOLOGY AREAS BY DEGREE OF DIFFICULTY FOR THE 
EUROPEAN UNION’S INNOVATION INDUSTRIAL BASE AND 
CAPACITY TO ACT INDEPENDENTLY?  
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TABLE 3:  WHICH POWER (WORLDWIDE) IS THE LEADER IN EACH OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL AREAS? (2021 & 2030)*
2021 2030 2021 2030 2021 2030
Artificial Intelligence 60.4 % 37.0 % 31.3 % 55.0 % 3.7 % 6.8 %
Cloud Computing 95.0 % 66.9 % 3.0 % 26.6 % 1.0 % 5.5 %
Semiconductors 43.5 % 29.4 % 24.1 % 47.0 % 6.4 % 11.7 %
Quantum Technologies 57.7 % 48.5 % 20.6 % 33.0 % 9.5 % 16.8 %
5G and Mobile Network Equipment 4.8 % 8.5 % 72.6 % 63.8 % 17.7 % 24.7 %
*Some totals do not add up to 100% due to an ‘other’ category where various different countries may have been considered leaders. Such as Taiwan, for example, on semiconductors.
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 2.4  MAPPING EUROPEAN STRATEGIES 
AND OBSTACLES 
When asked about how the EU should position itself amid 
a US-China tech confrontation, stakeholders are almost 
evenly split. A slim majority (54 percent) believe the EU 
should chart an independent path between the two, while 
46 percent believe the EU should move closer to the US (see 
Fig. 6). This reflects very live debates in European capitals 
about how to shape industrial policy and market access vis-
à-vis the US given the already existing dependencies. None 
of the respondents felt Europe should move closer to China.
The survey also gauged expert views across 12 potential ob-
stacles to Europe’s capacity to act in the digital technology 
space (see Fig. 10). On each issue, respondents were asked 
to rate each obstacle on a scale of importance between one 
(least important) and five (most important) as a hindrance 
to Europe’s technological leadership in a global context. 
They were then asked to rate the same obstacles by the de-
gree of difficulty for Europe to overcome them.
Two broad findings stand out in this data: 
1. Respondents perceive a generally noticeable positive 
correlation between difficulty and importance across 
issues. This is consistent with some of the challenges 
recognized for generations, like availability of venture 
capital investment and commercialization of research. 
2. By far, respondents saw Europe’s lack of first mov-
er advantage and absence of dominant incumbent tech 
players as a central obstacle to its capacity to act. Re-
spondents were able to prioritize across obstacles with 
some areas where the EU has shown strength – like ba-
sic R&D and public-private partnerships – which are 
perceived less difficult and less important to Europe’s 
quest for digital sovereignty.
This is not meant to be a comprehensive list of policy and 
economic conditions informing Europe’s digital competi-
tiveness landscape. Important issues were left out. Issues 
like levels of connectivity and the incomplete digital single 
market clearly also play important roles in shaping Europe’s 
position in the world. But this composite snapshot captures 
many of the key potential barriers addressed by policy mak-
ers and analysts when assessing Europe’s standing in glob-
al tech leadership.
FIGURE 8:  HOW SHOULD THE EU POSITION ITSELF IN THE 
US-CHINA TECH CONFRONTATION?
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2.5  EUROPE’S GLOBAL OBJECTIVES AND 
INSTRUMENTS ON TECH POLICY
On Europe’s global objectives (see Fig.11), two issues stand 
out and clearly reflect the policy priorities on emerging 
technology in Brussels and many capitals across the EU. 
The first is pushing for greater competitiveness in emerging 
technology areas, which is by far seen as the most import-
ant priority and also something that is relatively difficult to 
achieve. Europe’s efforts in this area – spanning the digital 
single market, regulation to open new spaces for technolo-
gy competition, and industrial policy – remain at the center 
of the European Commission’s digital agenda. 
Second, is the use of emerging technologies to improve 
sustainability and lower carbon emissions. Climate and tech 
competitiveness are followed by a cluster of global objec-
tives, including cyber-stability, digital rights, global digi-
tal rules, and an open global Internet. All areas are seen as 
moderately difficult to achieve. 
Discovering how to employ emerging technologies in mili-
tary contexts is seen as both the most difficult potential ob-
jective and the second least important. New efforts to build 
stronger connective tissue between NATO and the EU on 
emerging technology might raise the profile of this cause. 
But currently it remains a relatively low priority. More strik-
ingly, the role of tech access and adoption in the Global 
South is perceived as both the least difficult and least im-
portant objective for the EU. This could reflect the more in-
ward-looking nature of EU member states but could also 
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emerge as a blind spot if policy does not take into account 
the linkages between tech adoption in developing coun-
tries and other objectives like competitiveness, the ability 
to make global rules, and the shaping of digital rights.
The EU has a few useful tools at hand that can help advance 
its global tech objectives. The first is the EU’s regulato-
ry framework. Market access and Europe’s ability to use its 
regulatory weight to pull people around to its own values 
feature prominently in stakeholders’ minds, with significant 
numbers identifying these regulatory tools as very effective. 
The ability of the EU to influence global standard-setting – 
likely the result of the preponderant influence of Europe’s 
leading standard-setting bodies including the European 
Committee for Standardization (CEN) and the Committee 
for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC)- and the 
development of frameworks like the General Data Protec-
tion Regulation (GDPR) – turn countries around the world 
to the EU’s way of doing things. 
Interestingly, European outbound foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) is seen as a less effective instrument in the EU’s 
quest to achieve its global technology objectives. Given the 
role of US FDI as an instrument of American tech leadership 
and rising awareness of Chinese FDI, such as Tencent ac-
quisitions in the European mobile gaming industry and Ali-
Cloud’s data center acquisitions, it’s interesting to see that 
this tool is not perceived as particularly effective for the EU 
to advance its global interests. The situation is similar in the 
case of public-private partnerships. Perception of Europe-
an innovation leadership in emerging technology areas is 
by far seen as the EU’s least effective potential instrument. 
The data also reveals clear trends around how partici-
pants feel tech policy should be managed between the EU 
and national levels. On the EU level, overwhelming major-
ities saw four key policy drivers: industrial policy, regula-
tory policy, strategic vision, and international cooperation. 
Of those, a majority ranks “regulatory policy” as most im-
portant (77 percent rated it as important or very important). 
This is unsurprising given the EU’s high-profile role in dig-
ital regulation and its ambitious regulatory agenda around 
the Digital Services Act, the Digital Markets Act, data gover-
nance, cloud rules, and cybersecurity. Respondents also at-
tach a great deal of importance to the EU’s role in shaping 
a coherent strategic vision for tech policy (70 percent rated 
as important or very important). However, in this area, the 
role of member states is also rated highly, although slightly 
less than the EU, suggesting recognition of a desire or need 
for multilevel coordination, where both the EU and individ-
ual member states have a role to play.   
FIGURE 11:  PLEASE RATE THE FOLLOWING INSTRUMENTS THAT 
THE EU POSSESSES TO ADVANCE ITS OBJECTIVES FOR TECH-
NOLOGY IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS IN TERMS OF EFFECTIVENESS 
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At the member state level (Fig. 13, the aggregate response 
places the greatest importance on each member state’s 
ability to shape an effective industrial policy (60 percent 
rated it as important or very important). This is not to say 
that the EU should not play a role in industrial policy. Ac-
cording to the stakeholder response, both EU and mem-
ber-state roles in industrial policy are important. The 
member state role is also seen as slightly more important in 
establishing public-private partnerships. 
Interestingly, a significant number of participants saw the 
EU’s role in fostering international cooperation as more im-
portant than that of individual member states. We could at-
tribute this coordinating power across 27 member states is 
better suited to shaping Europe’s technological capacity to 
act in a global context in a coherent way. Some participants 
felt that the EU should take the lead on this, with 30 per-
cent saying that the member states are of little or no im-
portance in international digital cooperation.
5.9 39.525.223.5 5.9
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FIGURE 12:  PLEASE RATE THE IMPORTANCE OF EACH POLI-
CY FIELD TO SHAPE THE CAPACITY TO ACT AT THE EU LEVEL:  
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FIGURE 13:  PLEASE RATE THE IMPORTANCE OF EACH 
POLICY FIELD TO SHAPE THE CAPACITY TO ACT AT THE 
LEVEL OF INDIVIDUAL EU MEMBER STATES:  
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Assessing  
Capacity to Act 
in 5 Key  
Enabling Tech-
nology Areas  
The Stakeholder Snapshot makes Europe’s exposure acute-
ly apparent. It also points to some of the instruments the 
EU has and obstacles it faces in its quest for peer and lead-
ership status in key technology areas. This section takes 
a deeper look at each of the five technology areas to pro-
vide an overview of the field, analysis of current policy ap-
proaches, and practical recommendations for how the EU 
can push forward in each area. The five technology areas 
are consistent with those mentioned above: AI, cloud com-
puting, semiconductors, 5G and mobile equipment, and 
quantum technology. 
The content in this section is based on reviews of key lit-
erature and primary source material, interviews with rel-
evant actors, and quantitative inputs from the stakeholder 
survey. The stakeholders in the survey also provided addi-
tional analysis and policy recommendations, and the sur-
vey results inform the recommendations we have made for 
each technology area. For each technology we look into 
the state of play and current policy approach to ground 
our recommendations. 
Here’s what is meant by those terms:
The State of Play covers the industrial and technological 
capabilities in current global value chains. But also includes 
how able actors are to innovate in each specific technology 
area by looking at indicators such as the number of relevant 
patents, technology-specific export portions or production 
statistics, market share, or the number of relevant start-ups 
in each technology area21. 
21 Jakob Edler et. al, “Technologiesouveränität. Von der Förderung zum Konzept,“ Fraunhofer Institut (Juli 2020).
22  Furthermore, the debate concerning ‘digital sovereignty’ or capacity to act also encompasses questions of cybersecurity and resilience of digital infrastructures. Currently, 
several initiatives on EU level are in the making or already published, which aim at tackling these issues, including the NIS Directive Review, the establishment of a Joint 
Cyber Unit, and the Cyber Security Strategy issued in December 2020. Aspects of cybersecurity are reflected in the study, however, but not in their entirety.
23  Isabel Skierka, “Öffentliche Anhörung zum Thema IT-Sicherheit von Hard- und Software als Voraussetzung für digitale Souveränität“ [“Public hearing on 
IT security of hardware and software as a prerequisite for digital sovereignty“], (December 10, 2019): https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/672536/
b2b63aeeaffe54e40f8c62571cc628c4/Stellungnahme-Skierka-data.pdf (accessed November 10, 2020). See also Falk Steiner and Viktoria Grzymek, “Digital Sovereignty  
in the EU”, European Public Goods, Bertelsmann Stiftung (Juli 2020), p.7: “There have been no convincing empirical studies on Europe’s actual dependencies to date.”
The Current Policy Approach looks at whether the EU and 
its member states have specific visions and targets regard-
ing a specific technology and how detailed these are. It 
builds upon institutional instruments – the tools the EU has 
at its disposal – and puts them into political context. 
These sections also look at the extent to which there is pol-
icy coherence among member states or between the EU 
and individual member states.
The five new key enabling technology areas analyzed in this 
study were selected based on their dual-use or even gen-
eral-purpose nature and whether they influence economic 
and military competitiveness. These technologies have also 
been chosen because they have become areas of geopolitical 
contention, which will be showcased in the next chapters. 
While this study deals with each technology separately, it’s 
important to understand that these technologies in fact de-
pend on each other and are often inter-related. For instance, 
AI systems can only become more effective as there are ad-
vances in the semiconductor industry, just as the increase in 
computation power and the huge and steady accumulation 
of data provide the necessary ingredients for more complex 
systems. The same interrelationship, for instance, can be 
drawn between cloud and edge infrastructures and advanc-
es that may be triggered by 5G technology. Therefore, even 
though these technologies are grouped, the mutual condi-
tionality between them is important to keep in mind22. 
Increasing Europe’s capacity to act in the tech space is a 
long-term task. It will not be achieved in a mere year or two 
and it will involve, coordinating industrial commitments, 
securing access to skills and investments across the bloc, 
and formulating supportive policies at the member state 
level. Through the Digital Compass, the EU has just begun 
the process of overviewing competencies and responsibil-
ities concerning new enabling technology areas on the EU 
level.23 This exercise helps us to identify strengths and vul-
nerabilities in the digital and technological realm and to ex-
plore which measures we need to maintain or enhance to 
improve the EU’s capacity to act. Against this backdrop, for-
eign policy decision-makers can determine in which key 
enabling technology areas capacity building is most urgent-
ly needed and can have the greatest impact. 
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Artificial intelligence (AI) is on track to penetrate all areas 
of life by enabling new forms of medical screening and pa-
tient treatment; self-driving vehicles; easier, more nat-
ural man-machine interfaces; more efficient logistics; 
better farming techniques and crop yields; and faster deci-
sion-making in everything from insurance, to banking, po-
licing, and even national security. According to one study, 
global GDP will be 14 percent higher in 2030 due to efficien-
cies from using AI. This amount of GDP in absolute terms is 
more than the current GDP of China and India combined.24 
The transformational potential of AI has put heavy pressure 
on the EU, whose competitive industries – once defined by 
engineering precision – are increasingly defined by inte-
grated systems powered by AI and data. As the Stakeholder 
Snapshot shows, there is a perception that two “AI super-
powers” – the US and China – are battling it out for superi-
ority in the AI space and leaving the EU behind.25 But Europe 
is still in the game. It has an academic research base on par 
with both the US and China – reflected in the comparative-
ly high number of AI research and conference papers.  Ac-
24  PwC, “Sizing the prize. What’s the real value of AI for your business and how can you capitalise?,” (2017), p.3:  
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/analytics/assets/pwc-ai-analysis-sizing-the-prize-report.pdf (accessed November 10, 2020).
25  Carly Minsky, “One former Google exec says there’s no hope for Europe’s artificial intelligence sector”, Sifted, (December 14, 2018):  
https://sifted.eu/articles/interview-google-kaifu-lee-ai-artificial-intelligence (accessed November 10, 2020). Raymond Perrault et. Al, “The AI Index 2019 Annual Report”, 
Stanford University Human-Centered AI Institute (December 2019): https://hai.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/ai_index_2019_report.pdf (accessed April 21, 2021).
26  Raymond Perrault et. Al, “The AI Index 2019 Annual Report”, Stanford University Human-Centered AI Institute (December 2019):  
https://hai.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj10986/f/ai_index_2019_report.pdf (accessed November 10, 2020).
27  Gleb Chuvpilo, “Who’s Ahead in AI Research in 2020? Insights from the International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML 2020)”, Medium, July 14, 2020:  
https://medium.com/@chuvpilo/whos-ahead-in-ai-research-in-2020-2009da5cd799 (accessed November 10, 2020).
28  Zachary Arnold et. al, “Identifying AI-Related Companies: A Conceptual Outline and Proof of Concept”, Center for Security and Emerging Technology (July, 2020):  
https://cset.georgetown.edu/research/identifying-ai-related-companies (accessed November 10, 2020).
29  Ulrike Franke, “Harnessing Artificial Intelligence,“ European Council on Foreign Relations (June 2019), pp. 4-5:  
https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/3_Harnessing_artificial_intelligence.pdf (accessed November 10, 2020).
30 Minsky, “One former Google exec says there’s no hope for Europe’s artificial intelligence sector,” (see note 31).
cording to the Global AI Talent Tracker, 29 percent of the 
top-tier AI researchers currently come from China, 20 per-
cent are from the US and 18 percent are from Europe.26 That 
puts Europe only a small way behind the US. Europe has 
strengths in IoT and industrial data-based AI applications 
due to its globally respected manufacturing base as well as 
new research hubs like Baden-Württemberg’s Cyber Valley 
or the strong AI start-up scenes in cities such as Stockholm 
and Paris. However, there are three key sticking points that 
hinder Europe’s ambitions to catch-up in the global AI race. 
The first of those sticking points is Europe’s inability to com-
mercialize its AI developments. This is especially problematic 
because the private sector largely drives AI research demand 
and investment.27 Europe trails behind the US and China in 
its number of registered AI-related patents. Only two Euro-
pean companies (Siemens and Philips) are among the glob-
al top ten AI patent-holding companies.28 The EU has some 
clout in specific fields like patents for autonomous vehicles29 
but its broader inability to move from basic research to ap-
plied use cases capitalized by European industry is a central 
gap in European AI competitiveness. It has also left Europe 
without the kind of attractive commercial research ecosys-
tems that exist in places like the US and Canada, which have 
drawn top European talent across the Atlantic.30 







Source: Daniel Castro et. al, “Who Is Winning the AI Race: China, the EU or the United States?”, 
Center for Data Innovation (August 19, 2019)
Source: “The Global AI Talent Tracker”, MacroPolo (March 14, 2021)
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The second sticking point is lack of access to venture capital 
and limited prospects for scaling-up. In 2018, Europe (UK in-
cluded) was second only to the US in terms of the number of 
AI start-ups, accounting for 22 percent of the overall num-
ber of AI startups on the global market.31 However, only six of 
those EU-based start-ups are among the world’s top 100.32 
The COVID-19 crisis has created an influx of capital into 
Europe’s AI start-up scene as investors and governments 
ploughed money into specific areas like AI health applica-
tions. However, it remains to be seen whether this capital 
will continue to be deployed for future funding rounds or to 
build a broader AI tech start-up scene in Europe.
Finally, there is the question of data usage. Data is key to 
AI systems, since algorithms need to be trained how to op-
erate by consuming and learning from data sets. The size 
and quality of data sets on which an AI application has been 
trained therefore directly impact its real-world utility.33 The 
EU’s strong data protection regulation, which makes it a 
global leader in some settings, makes it difficult to obtain 
personal data sets from which AI applications can be trained. 
Whereas in China extensive data sets of faces and popula-
tion movements, can be developed with very few restric-
tions and be actively pursued by the government, itself.34
European lawmakers need to find ways to harness data for 
AI while preserving its strong track record and reputation 
on data protection. The EU is now taking its first steps in 
this direction by implementing a flexible pilot for open ac-
cess to research data in the Horizon Europe program. As 
part of that program, efforts are underway to create clear 
guidelines for anonymization that would allow Europe 
to take advantage of the continent’s high-quality pools of 
health data.35 However, leveraging these strengths against 
the backdrop of the EU’s diminishing competitiveness in AI 
31  Axelle Lemaire et al., “Artificial Intelligence – A Strategy for European Startups: Recommendations for Policymakers,” Roland Berger and Asgard – Human Venture Capital 
(2018), p.7: https://asgard.vc/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Artificial-Intelligence-Strategy-for-Europe-2018.pdf (accessed March 17, 2021).
32  “AI 100: The Artificial Intelligence Startups Redefining Industries,” CBINSIGHTS (March 3, 2020):  
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/artificial-intelligence-top-startups (accessed March 1, 2021).
33  Thomas C. Redman, “If Your Data Is Bad, Your Machine Learning Tools Are Useless,” Harvard Business Review, (April 02, 2018):  
https://hbr.org/2018/04/if-your-data-is-bad-your-machine-learning-tools-are-useless (accessed March 01, 2021).
34  EPRS, “The impact of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on artificial intelligence,” (June 2020):  
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/de/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2020)641530 (accessed October 21, 2020).
35  Daniel Castro, Michael McLaughlin and Eline Chivot, “Who Is Winning the AI Race: China, the EU or the United States?,” Center For Data Innovation (August 19, 2019):  
https://www.datainnovation.org/2019/08/who-is-winning-the-ai-race-china-the-eu-or-the-united-states (accessed March 01, 2021).
36  The former document sets out a triad of general objectives, namely 1) stimulating the industrial capabilities, 2) preparing the member states for socio-economic  
changes as well as 3) ensuring an appropriate ethical and legal framework.
37  The ‘Coordinated Plan’ also states “the ambition is for Europe to become the world-leading region for developing and deploying cutting-edge, ethical and secure AI, 
promoting a human-centric approach in the global context.” European Commission, “Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence,” (December 7, 2018):  
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/coordinated-plan-artificial-intelligence (accessed March 01, 2021).
38  European Commission, “High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence,”, (November 18, 2020):  
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/high-level-expert-group-artificial-intelligence (accessed March 01, 2021).
39  In her speech in the European Parliament, she even promised that in her first 100 days, she “will put forward legislation for a coordinated European approach on the human 
and ethical implications of artificial intelligence.” Access Partnership, “Europe Sets Sights on AI Regulation Within 100 Days,” September 16, 2019:  
https://www.accesspartnership.com/europe-sets-sights-on-ai-regulation-within-100-days (accessed March 01, 2021).
40  European Commission, “On Artificial Intelligence-a european approach to excellence and trust”, (February 19, 2020): 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/commission-white-paper-artificial-intelligence-feb2020_en.pdf (accessed April 07, 2021).
41  Interestingly, in a previous leaked version of the white paper in January 2020, a potential time-limited ban of facial recognition technology on public spaces  
was put up for discussion. At the end, however, the final document abstains from a complete ban and envisages rather severe requirements.
will prove a major mid-term challenge, especially given that 
reforms could take years to materialize.
Current Policy Approach
During the European Commission’s Jean-Claude Junck-
er years (2014-2019), the EU began to sketch out a strategic 
framework for its approach to AI36 that included investing 
€20 billion per year in AI from 2020 onwards. 37 A High-Level 
Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG) was also launched, 
consisting of representatives from politics, industry, the re-
search community, and civil society who together laid out 
seven guiding principles for ethical and trustworthy AI.38
When Ursula Von der Leyen became European Commis-
sion president, she set the EU’s sights on delivering a reg-
ulatory proposal on “trustworthy AI”.39 The term basically 
refers to the notion that AI will be used under the condi-
tions of strong data protection and limit the application of 
AI for rightful purposes according to the European values 
of democracy and human dignity. The EU’s February 2020 
AI White Paper provides some guiding principles and some 
practical measures towards achieving the “twin objectives” 
of simulating indigenous European AI innovation and ad-
dressing potential AI-associated risks.40 The paper sets out 
the need for stricter regulation on the question of whether 
an AI system is deemed “high risk” based on assessment of 
a technology’s use and sector. In the first “use” criteria, ex-
amples include recruitment processes or remote biometric 
identification. The second criterion includes sectors char-
acterized by a high-risk density.41 As of writing this report, 
the European Commission is working to integrate this risk 
classification system into a legislative proposal for AI that 
will likely set the tone for global discourse on AI regulations 
and standards.
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The European Commission has also recognized the im-
portance of data for developing AI technologies. The EU’s 
Data Strategy has the stated aim of creating a single EU 
market for data, particularly in non-personal, industri-
al data areas.42 The strategy outlines the goals for a Data 
Act with incentives for business-to-government and busi-
ness-to-business data sharing, including potential legal 
obligations for sharing data in certain cases. The aim is to 
create nine sector-specific “Common European Data Spac-
es”, in which different stakeholders pool their data to devel-
op new applications for AI. This act is at the heart of EU’s 
attempt to get data economies of scale that can help it de-
velop its competitive edge when faced with the massive in-
cumbent advantages held by American and Chinese tech.43 
In essence, the EU wants to combine its strong industri-
al base with digitalization. However, a key challenge will be 
to persuade the private and the public sector to share da-
ta. Here, incentives and the promise of data protection (e.g. 
via data anonymization) will likely have to form a part of the 
upcoming Data Act.
The COVID-19 crisis has acted as an impetus for increased 
innovation, adoption, and financing of AI.44 The Europe-
an Commission remains committed to its aim of attracting 
over €20 billion in investments into European AI by lever-
aging existing funding programs like the Digital Europe 
Program, Horizon Europe, and the European Structural and 
Investment Funds. The European Commission Next Gen-
eration EU fund also includes €150 billion for technology 
R&D and digitization. France’s 2018 AI for Humanity Strate-
gy included a pledge of €1.5 billion by 2022, including €700 
million for research. Based on its 2018 AI strategy, Germa-
ny approved a €3 billion investment in AI capabilities un-
til 2025. It then increased the amount to €5 billion as part 
of its COVID-19 stimulus package. Many of these efforts are 
driven by large core member states – France and Germa-
ny in particular. As such, these policies exist on the nation-
al level and could be duplicated by other member states 
across the EU.
Despite a recognition that AI mastery pits Europe in direct 
competition with the United States and China, the EU’s ap-
proach does not adequately address some of the underly-
ing geopolitical tensions. For example, the growing trend 
of digital authoritarianism and dual-use potential of AI sys-
tems remains largely unaddressed. Another area in which 
the EU’s White Paper on AI falls short is in addressing the 
42   European Commission, “A European strategy for data”, (February 19, 2020):  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1582551099377&uri=CELEX:52020DC0066 (accessed April 07, 2021). 
43  Those thematic data spaces include, among others, industrial (manufacturing), mobility, health and agriculture.
44   Guntram Wolff, “Europe may be the world’s AI referee, but referees don’t win”, Politico, (February 17, 2020):  
https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-may-be-the-worlds-ai-referee-but-referees-dont-win-margrethe-vestager (accessed March 01, 2021).
45  Besides the expert groups on EU level, the Ad Hoc Committee on Artificial Intelligence (CAHAI) of the Council of Europe in the wider European context, the two expert 
groups at OECD level (comprising European states and the US) or the Ad Hoc Expert Group for the Recommendation on the Ethics of AI at the UNESCO deal with AI 
guidelines. In none of the mentioned fora, however, all three actors – the EU, US and China – have a common membership.
competing interests between AI and data protection. There 
is no AI without data, and in the EU, available data is severe-
ly limited by GDPR. In sum, the European Commission has 
to address more strategically how it wants to keep up in the 
AI race while not compromising on data protection.
Recommendations
Europe needs to catch up to the US and China in the com-
mercialization of its AI technologies and access to da-
ta sources. Research capabilities and talent in this area are 
strong but the EU has fallen far behind in translating its in-
digenous strengths into commercialized advantages that 
could strengthen Europe’s innovation industrial base. To do 
so, Europe should:  
1. Leverage AI norms, standards, and regulation to codi-
fy European values: The EU should work on its legal and 
ethical AI framework and take the issue of AI regulation, 
norms, and standards beyond its own continent. In or-
der to fulfil its global AI ambitions, the EU should en-
gage with like-minded states to solidify its global vision 
of how AI should be used. The EU should pursue the de-
velopment of AI principles, norms and standardize mul-
tiple formats and organizations – the Council of Europe, 
OECD, G20, UNESCO, ITU and standard setting bod-
ies45 – to promote its “human-centered AI” approach 
internationally as a direct counter-narrative to author-
itarian AI, which is now on the rise through enhanced 
COVID-19 driven surveillance and China’s increasing-
ly strident efforts to export AI-powered facial/voice 
recognition technologies and predictive analytics in its 
partner countries. This should include some mention of 
the geopolitical dimension in the upcoming European 
Commission’s new AI legislative proposal. 
2. Create large-scale public data pools usable for both AI 
research and AI application: Many AI systems need data 
sets to be trained. And the higher quality the data is and 
the more of it that exists, the more effective and accu-
rate AI applications can be. The benefits of this are most 
obvious for sectors like health care, where the use of 
AI can already save lives today. But data availability can 
help spur AI innovation in many areas. At a minimum, 
data sets involving personal data need to be anonymized 
in accordance with GDPR. But further guidance will al-
so be needed to interpret vague regulations to ensure 
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there are no roadblocks to AI adaptation and advance-
ments. The EU and its member states should push to-
wards a broad open-data mandate (based on successful 
open-access mandates) to unify currently siloed public 
data pools. Additionally, the EU needs to develop an ap-
proach to incentivize the creation of pools of industri-
al data as well.
3. Accelerate adoption of AI-based processes in the pub-
lic sector: The EU and its member states should lever-
age COVID-19 relief efforts to incentivize the adoption 
of AI in the public sector through procurement man-
dates, funding, and tax structures. The EU should also 
identify AI use cases that could have the biggest impact 
and actively seek out private partners to create them, 
emphasizing cooperation with SMEs and start-ups, to 
implement AI-based processes. This sets an example in 
AI adaptation, builds trust in AI, provides valuable first-
hand knowledge about the use of AI to officials, and can 
help make public administration more efficient as well, 
directly connecting the EU and its people. Furthermore, 
it supports and nurtures the domestic tech ecosystem 
at the same time.
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The dominance of US cloud service providers in Europe is 
a recognized fact. The Stakeholder Snapshot shows that 
over 76 percent of participants believe Europe is overly de-
pendent on external actors and those actors are majority 
US-based (92.7 percent). With an accumulated 52 percent 
global market share,46 US tech giants Amazon (Amazon 
Web Services) and Microsoft (Microsoft Azure) are lead-
ing the field.47 Tencent and Alibaba from China are the only 
non-American enterprises in the top eight of the approx-
imately €300 billion cloud computing market. However, 
these two companies and, to a lesser extent, China Telecom 
and Huawei, are gaining market share in the domestic Chi-
nese and broader East Asian markets.
The cloud computing landscape favors large first movers 
that are able to develop path-dependent service relations 
with their users. Cloud users are locked into relationships 
with providers whose suite of offerings and terms of service 
regarding data interoperability and portability make it diffi-
cult to move to other providers. As noted in the stakehold-
er survey, first mover advantage is seen as both the most 
46 This counts for platform as a service (PaaS), infrastructure as a service (IaaS) and for hosted private cloud services.
47  Felix Richter, “Amazon Leads $130-Billion Cloud Market,” Statista, (February 4, 2021):  
https://www.statista.com/chart/18819/worldwide-market-share-of-leading-cloud-infrastructure-service-providers (accessed March 01, 2021). 
48  Mike Robuck, “Report: Amazon and Microsoft reign supreme in European cloud market,” Fierce Telecom, (May 7, 2020):  
https://www.fiercetelecom.com/operators/report-amazon-and-microsoft-reign-supreme-european-cloud-market (accessed March 01, 2021).
49  Serge Leblal, “285 millions d’euros pour Andromède, le cloud souverain français” [“285 million euros for Andromède, the French sovereign cloud“], Lemonde Informatique, 
(September 21, 2011): https://www.lemondeinformatique.fr/actualites/lire-285-millions-d-euros-pour-andromede-le-cloud-souverain-francais-41990.html (accessed 
March 01, 2021). Christof Kerkmann, “Microsoft and Deutsche Telekom’s ‘German cloud’ wafts away”, Handelsblatt Today, (March 13, 2018): https://www.handelsblatt.com/
english/companies/remote-access-microsoft-and-deutsche-telekoms-german-cloud-wafts-away/23581454.html (accessed March 01, 2021).
50  European Commission, “Towards a next generation cloud for Europe”, (October 12, 2020):  
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/towards-next-generation-cloud-europe (accessed March 01, 2021).
51 Kaan Sahin and Emilia Neuber, “Bright or Cloudy?,” Berlin Policy Journal, (June 18, 2020): https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/bright-or-cloudy (accessed March 01, 2021).
important and most difficult barrier holding back Europe-
an competitiveness in key enabling technologies likes cloud 
computing. Developing a cloud infrastructure is also high-
ly capital-intensive, requiring large networks of data cen-
ters and IT professionals maintaining operations. These 
high barriers to entry have been partially responsible for a 
relatively concentrated cloud market landscape in Europe. 
This is why Europe is highly dependent on US cloud provid-
ers such as Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and IBM. European 
players such as Deutsche Telekom, Orange, and OVHcloud 
are among the top five cloud providers in their respective 
countries but trail behind American companies, even in 
terms of usage across Europe.48
European attempts to gain a meaningful foothold in cloud 
computing have so far proven unsuccessful, even in the do-
mestic market. France’s Andromède sovereign cloud proj-
ect, launched in 2009 as a response to US cloud computing 
advances, poured over €200 million into two cloud provid-
ers only to see the initiative wound down in 2014 with little 
fanfare.49 Projects like the European Alliance on Industrial 
Data and Cloud as well as GAIA-X, which are designed to 
create a cloud-based infrastructure on European standards, 
could face similar challenges.50 
Current Policy Approach
The EU Data Strategy bluntly states that the EU needs to 
reduce its dependency on foreign cloud infrastructure and 
cloud providers. The EU has warned against the extrater-
ritorial jurisdictional assertions in the US CLOUD Act and 
China’s Cybersecurity Law, which includes possible access 
provisions for data servers of American and Chinese serv-
ers, based in Europe.51 This warning has been echoed by EU 
member states, particularly in Germany and France. Ger-
many’s January 2021 Data Strategy also refers to GAIA-X as 
a means of emancipating Europe from locked-in cloud ser-
vices (currently all American), which are seen as an immedi-
ate challenge given Europe’s accelerated adoption of cloud 
services for public administration, schooling, and health-
care during the COVID-19 crisis. 
The European Commission has proposed investing up to €2 
billion in high impact data spaces and federated cloud in-
frastructure with a potential additional €2-4 billion com-
FIGURE 16:  AMAZON LEADS 130-BILLION CLOUD MARKET. 
WORLDWIDE MARKET SHARE OF LEADING CLOUD INFRA-
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ing from member state and industry co-investment. All 27 
member states have agreed to participate in a so-called €10 
billion Alliance for Industrial Data and Cloud. This effort 
could eventually roll into an Important Project of Common 
European Interest (IPCEI), a special industrial policy vehicle 
aimed at an indigenous European federated cloud that can 
avoid being subject to state-aid restrictions. Some member 
states have already taken matters forward, for example with 
the GAIA-X project, which was initiated and developed by 
Germany and France and evolved into a legal non-profit or-
ganization in Brussels with the name GAIA-X AISBL. GAIA-X 
is a federated, pan-European cloud infrastructure project 
that aims to increase competition in the European cloud 
market and achieve “data sovereignty”.52 GAIA-X is not an 
alternative European platform to rival the likes of Amazon 
Web Services or Microsoft Azure, but it should contain a 
common set of rules and standards for portability, interop-
erability, and interconnectivity of data. Most recently, the 
European Commission announced the target of deploying 
10,000 secure edge computing nodes by 2030.53  
Other attempts at building native European cloud ser-
vices have proved difficult. The German attempt at estab-
lishing a tool for secure communication as an alternative 
to email called De-Mail was not successful, neither was the 
Franco-German initiative to create a European search en-
gine called Quaero. Nonetheless, the GAIA-X project will be 
52 BMWi, “Project GAIA-X,” (December 29, 2019): https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Publikationen/Digitale-Welt/project-gaia-x.pdf (accessed March 01, 2021).
53  “2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade”, (March 09, 2021):  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:12e835e2-81af-11eb-9ac9-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF (accessed April 07, 2021). 
54  European Commission, “Commission welcomes Member States’ declaration on EU cloud federation”, (October 15, 2020):  
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/commission-welcomes-member-states-declaration-eu-cloud-federation (accessed March 01, 2021).
an important part of the new European cloud federation, 
which was announced by all 27 EU member states in a com-
mon declaration under the auspices of the German Europe-
an Council Presidency in October 2020.54 The declaration 
aims to politically underpin the native cloud concept from a 
multilateral perspective.
European cloud computing initiatives are still at an ear-
ly stage. Even GAIA-X, for example, must still address fun-
damental questions about implementation, funding, and 
questions about whether anyone will use it. GAIA-X could 
also raise bureaucratic overhead with a potential abun-
dance of technical specifications that could unintentionally 
strengthen the position of the leading American cloud pro-
viders if it turns out they already adhere to GAIA-X stan-
dards or only have to make very minor changes to do so. 
GAIA-X and efforts around it are a case study in Europe´s 
quest for enhancing its capacity to act in the technological 
realm. The fact that its focus is on a federated data infra-
structure system rather than building a European company 
that could scale massively shows that the initiators are well 
aware of the difficulties of entering the cloud market. GA-
IA-X tries to circumvent the weaknesses of European cloud 
players and combine the EU’s regulatory and data protec-
tion strengths with potential new market entries.
TABLE 4:  TIMELINE GAIA-X 
October 2019 Announcement of the set-up of GAIA-X at the Digital Summit 2019 in Dortmund  
by German Economy Minister Peter Altmaier.
February 2020 Germany and France sign a joint position paper on GAIA-X which solidifies France’s role in the project.
June 2020 Germany and France present the technical concept and the organization’s structure.
September 2020 22 German and French companies found the Brussels-based GAIA-X AISBL,  
a non-profit organization steering the project.
November 2020 180 organizations and 4,000 participants attend GAIA-X Summit.  
Intent to launch seven national hubs is made public.1
December 2020 The German federal government’s intention to use GAIA-X participating  
cloud service providers is announced at the German Digital Summit.
Early 2021 GAIA-X Policy Rules Committee to establish basis for governance and access. 
Mid 2021 French OVHcloud and German Deutsche Telekom plan to provide a European cloud service  
based on GAIA-X.
Source:  GAIA-X, “Pan-European GAIA-X Summit”, (November 18, 2020)
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Recommendations
Europe’s data is a valuable asset and the EU should make 
sure it is able to derive value from it rather than giving it 
freely to other global players by allowing it to be hosted by 
foreign companies. The EU can make an impact in the cloud 
computing space if it can:
1. Learn from past mistakes and failed initiatives: Ini-
tiatives like De-Mail, Andromède, and Quaero failed to 
reach a wide audience. While the push for data sover-
eignty, currently spearheaded by the European Alliance 
for Industrial Data and Cloud and GAIA-X, is admirable, 
the initiatives can only be successful in the long-term 
if they can find users. And the most important factor 
in finding users is ensuring the cost is competitive and 
the services are reliable. Currently, European providers 
are not competitive in the market and the bureaucratic 
overhead (technical specifications and regulations that 
GAIA-X would enforce) is unlikely to change this for the 
better.
2. Lower barriers for market entry: Discussion about 
cloud providers and infrastructure often centers on the 
big players already active in the market. The initiators 
of GAIA-X hope that European companies will benefit 
from the opportunity of this new federated cloud infra-
structure project. But the EU should be careful that the 
project does not put more barriers in the way of large 
companies as well as SMEs and start-ups that may 
want to either use European cloud providers or devel-
op technologies that use GAIA-X.
3. Protect privacy as a matter of fundamental rights, 
not industrial policy: In its January 2021 Data Strate-
gy, Germany cited the invalidation of the EU-US Priva-
cy Shield as a reason Europe should decouple from US 
cloud services. Others have justified the need for air-
gapped cloud infrastructure55 on the basis of asymmet-
ric extraterritorial access by US authorities in European 
cyber-space. The EU must enforce rules to protect its 
citizens’ data. It can do so by setting and enforcing clear 
rules and leveraging its regulatory power to ensure 
abidance. The EU should use the GDPR to impose ful-
ly compliant protections on cross-border data transfers 
as part of an enhanced EU-US Privacy Shield framework 
and seek to create a mutual lawful access framework 
through a possible e-evidence directive. 
55  Air gapping refers to the virtual isolation of network compartments to avoid compromising them by being connected to unsecure clients and nodes.
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The semiconductor industry manufactures chips and micro-
processors, which are the key enabling components for com-
puter systems. Europe has never been a major player in this 
space and has lost even more ground in the sector over the 
last three decades. It is now highly dependent on American 
and Asian manufacturers for access to top-tier microchips.
In the case of semiconductors, the EU will find it very diffi-
cult to compete with incumbents. The three main steps in the 
production of microchips are design, manufacture, and then 
assembly, test, and packaging. Only a few companies such as 
Intel (US) or Samsung (South Korea) cover all three steps by 
themselves and even the ones that do, depend on suppliers 
to deliver crucial equipment for the manufacturing process. 
Even though the EU does contribute to this supply chain, it 
lacks a major player in either of these production steps
56   CyCraft Research Team, “APT Group Chimera - APT Operation Skeleton Key targets Taiwan Semiconductor Vendors”, CyCraft, (April 15, 2020):  
https://cycraft.com/download/%5BTLP-White%5D20200415%20Chimera_V4.1.pdf (accessed August 16, 2020).
Players from the US and East Asia dominate all stages of 
production in the high-end microchip market. Barriers to 
entry for cutting-edge products are very high, since cut-
ting-edge chip production requires both extensive knowl-
edge about processes as well as huge production facilities, 
which in turn depend on highly specialized personnel.
China’s biggest technological weakness lies in the semi-
conductors space. It has been trying to decrease its de-
cades-long dependence by spending the equivalent of 
several billion euros to support its own domestic semicon-
ductor industry and by engaging in industrial espionage to 
steal proprietary knowledge from others.56 Nevertheless, 
the gap between Chinese firms and global top-tier enter-
prises remains significant, and homegrown Chinese chips 
are roughly five years behind their US counterparts. While 
China is capable of handling semiconductor manufacturing 
to some extent, it has so far struggled to acquire the knowl-
edge base and IP to design its own chips. However, Taiwan 
is home to one of the leading semiconductor manufacturers 
Source:  Own work
FIGURE 17:  SELECTED MAJOR PLAYERS IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
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(TSMC) – a capability China desperately seeks. If geopoliti-
cal tensions in the region escalate beyond aforementioned 
industrial espionage through to cyber-attacks, the world’s 
chip supply will be seriously impacted.
Europe has lost ground in top-tier semiconductor produc-
tion. ARM Limited – a British company owned by the Japa-
nese Softbank and one of the very few leading European 
players – is in the process of being sold to American micro-
chip developer Nvidia, although the acquisition’s completion 
is in question. ARM’s chips are used in almost all smartphones 
worldwide and Apple recently switched from Intel based 
CPUs to ARM. ARM is a so-called fabless company, mean-
ing it does not produce chips itself but instead commissions 
foundries to produce chips. This production generally occurs 
outside of Europe. Still, the importance of ARM’s intellectual 
property should not be underestimated. The British govern-
ment is acutely aware of this and there is a significant chance 
that it – or another power – will block the sale to Nvidia. 
However, due to Brexit, the EU has already lost this expertise, 
which is a major blow to its capabilities in this area.
But European players do continue to lead in certain niche ar-
eas, such as automotive chip design, with stand-out compa-
nies including the Dutch-based NXP Semiconductors and 
the German-based Infineon. ASML, another Dutch produc-
tion company, has developed the most advanced method of 
miniaturization of chip structures via its Extreme Ultra-Vi-
olet (EUV) lithography system and has been caught in the 
crosshairs of the US-China tech rivalry for its sales to Chi-
nese companies.57 Without this technology, high-end chip 
production is not possible. So the international spotlight on 
ASML is well justified. Despite these pockets of competitive-
ness, Europe is not likely to be able to catch up in large-scale 
state-of-the-art semiconductor manufacturing in the me-
dium-term.58 The participants of the Stakeholder Snapshot 
who rated semiconductors as the most difficult area to im-
prove the EU’s capacity to act, also shared this assessment.
Instead of trying to close this gap, a promising approach – 
also pursued by China59 – is to gain a foothold in emerg-
ing new microprocessor applications (e.g. special purpose 
microchips to train AI algorithms (AI chips) or for specif-
ic applications in the IoT and industry production). One 
particularly interesting new technology in this regard 
is RISC-V, a new and open chip standard that could wipe 
57   Alexandra Alper et al., “Trump administration pressed Dutch hard to cancel China chip-equipment sale: sources,” Reuters, (January 6, 2020): https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-asml-holding-usa-china-insight/trump-administration-pressed-dutch-hard-to-cancel-china-chip-equipment-sale-sources-idUSKBN1Z50HN (accessed March 01, 2021).
58   Fraunhofer IMW, “GLOBAL COMPETITION IN MICROELECTRONICS INDUSTRY FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE: TECHNOLOGY, MARKETS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY,” (March 2018): https://www.imw.fraunhofer.de/content/dam/moez/de/documents/Working_Paper/180301_021_Microelectronics%20from%20a%20
European%20perspective_Dornbusch_öffentlich.pdf (accessed March 01, 2021)
59   Kaan Sahin, “What China’s “Chips Endeavor” Can Teach Europe,” Berlin Policy Journal, (October 14, 2019):  
https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/what-chinas-chips-endeavor-can-teach-europe (accessed March 01, 2021).
60  Ed Sperling, “RISC-V Gaining Traction,” Semiconductor Engineering, (July 30, 2020): https://semiengineering.com/risc-v-gaining-traction (accessed March 01, 2021).
61   Natalia Drozdiak and Helene Fouquet, “EU Weighs Deal With TSMC, Samsung for Semiconductor Foundry,” Bloomberg (February 11, 2021):  
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-11/europe-weighs-semiconductor-foundry-to-fix-supply-chain-risk (accessed March 01, 2021).
out the advantage of US players if it becomes competitive 
with current chip designs.60 It is not surprising that China 
is currently very active in driving development of RISC-V. 
However, both US and European contributions to this new 
standard are significant and all players stand to benefit 
from an open microprocessor ecosystem.
Europe is well-positioned to leverage these new applica-
tions because of its strengths in existing niche markets, as 
well as its strong base in semiconductor research, led by 
the Inter-university Micro Electronics Center (IMEC) in Bel-
gium, Laboratory of Electronics and Information Technolo-
gy (LETI) in France, and Fraunhofer Institute in Germany.
Another option for Europe to reduce its supply chain de-
pendencies is to ensure production capabilities within Eu-
rope, but not necessarily by European companies. To this 
end, the EU is weighing deals with high-end manufacturers 
like TSMC and Samsung.61
Current Policy Approach
Compared to the other technology areas, the semiconduc-
tor industry has been relatively low on the agenda of the 
EU institutions and member states. While the IPCEI Micro-
electronics focuses on five areas of chip technology (energy 
efficient chips, power semiconductors, sensors, advanced 
optical equipment, and compound materials) it is import-
ant to note that cutting-edge central processing units, as 
they are used in modern computers, are not among them. 
The need for novel legislation to regulate a completely new 
TABLE 5:  THERE ARE ONLY 3 MAJOR EUROPEAN SEMI-
CONDUCTOR MANUFACTURERS, RANKING 12TH, 13TH AND 






NXP Semiconductors 7,450 29,400
Sources: Anysilicon, “Top 15 Semiconductor Sales Leaders – 2019”, (2019); Infineon, “Facts & Figures”, 
(2020); Macrotrends; “NXP Semiconductors: Number of Employees 2009–2020 | NXPI,” (2020);  
Macrotrends, “STMicroelectronics: Number of Employees 2006–2020 | STM,” (2020)
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field, for instance, when it comes to AI, is very limited, and 
promoting European players in the high-end chip market 
would incur a huge cost.
Even though European Commission President Ursula von 
der Leyen claimed that the EU needs “mastery and own-
ership of key technologies in Europe [such as] critical chip 
technologies”,62 the EU and German government have not 
been forthcoming with initiatives to realize these goals. 
However, since chip-making has evolved into a focal point 
of the US-Chinese tech competition, the EU has slow-
ly started to become more active in this area. Twenty EU 
member states in December 2020 signed a declaration to 
launch a new European initiative aimed at making the EU 
competitive in high-end manufacturing and design.63 How-
ever, the declaration came with no actionable plans to back 
up those goals.
Increasing the EU’s semiconductor capabilities is also a ma-
jor aspect of the recently announced Digital Compass,64 al-
though the goals set out in this compass are rather vague 
and questionable from a technological perspective. For ex-
ample, the Digital Compass 2030 mixes up total and top-tier 
semiconductor manufacturing and reduces the definition of 
what top-tier manufacturing processes actually are to mere 
descriptions of nanometer processes – lacking the level of 
accuracy necessary to be actionable.
While the EU is trying to play catch-up, the US is already 
formulating the next step in its journey to reduce supply 
chain dependencies on China by furthering decoupling the 
manufacturing process.65 The EU will have to decide wheth-
er it wants to join the US effort or chart its own, indepen-
dent path. The Stakeholder Snapshot shows that even with 
primarily European participants, there is only a very narrow 
majority in favor of charting an independent path.
62   Ursula von der Leyen, “Speech by President-elect von der Leyen in the European Parliament Plenary on the occasion of the presentation of her College of Commissioners and 
their programme,” European Commission, (November 27, 2019): https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/enpt/speech_19_6408 (accessed March 01, 2021).
63   European Commission, “Member States join forces for a European initiative on processors and semiconductor technologies”, (December 7, 2020): https://ec.europa.eu/
digital-single-market/en/news/member-states-join-forces-european-initiative-processors-and-semiconductor-technologies (accessed March 01, 2021).
64   European Commission, “Europe’s Digital Decade: digital targets for 2030”, (March 9, 2021):  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/europes-digital-decade-digital-targets-2030 (accessed April 07, 2021).
65   Taisei Hoyama, Yu Nakamura, “US and allies to build ‘China-free’ tech supply chain,” Nikkei Asia, (February 24, 2021): 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Biden-s-Asia-policy/US-and-allies-to-build-China-free-tech-supply-chain (accessed March 01, 2021).
Recommendations
Europe has lost ground in semiconductor capabilities in the 
last decade and it is not realistic to expect it to catch up in 
terms of cutting-edge design and manufacturing capabili-
ties. Furthermore, the few remaining top-notch European 
chip companies will come under more pressure amid the 
US-Chinese tech competition. An EU semiconductor strat-
egy dealing with these developments is needed and should 
include the following objectives:
1. Preserve current chip production capabilities within 
Europe: To achieve this, the EU needs to protect essen-
tial companies in the semiconductor value chain, such 
as ASML, from foreign takeovers. Here, for instance, 
the EU should make use of its newly added instruments 
in the areas of foreign investment screening.
2. Support the growth of local manufacturing capabili-
ties: This includes creating manufacturing capabilities 
for foreign companies within Europe as well as helping 
private entities to enter the market in emerging new 
microprocessor applications. The EU should focus on 
special purpose microchips to train AI algorithms (AI 
chips) and leverage its existing strengths in IoT and the 
associated microchips IoT applications rely on.
3. Promote open standards in chip design and architec-
ture: Europe is lacking IP in this regard and lost its only 
major global player in chip design – ARM Limited. Open 
standards (e.g. RISC-V) can help level the playing field 
and reduce barriers for European companies to enter 
the market.
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3.4 5G AND MOBILE NETWORKS
State of Play
In 5G, Europe has good global positioning with two leading 
players – Ericsson (Sweden) and Nokia (Finland). These two 
companies compete directly with Chinese enterprises Hua-
wei and ZTE (see fig. 6).66 The US, in this case, does not have 
globally competitive industrial leaders.
 
The US may not have much skin in the game, but it would 
be premature to believe that 5G equipment leadership cen-
tered on two European companies and two Chinese compa-
nies will hold. Seoul-based Samsung, for example, is already 
challenging the 5G oligopoly with a massive expansion of 
5G tech investment and growth of crucial 5G standard es-
sential patents (SEPs).
In the 5G context, control of standard essential patents is a 
direct measure of potential market power.67 So much that 
companies often spoof control of standard essential patents 
through “over declaration”, to create the impression of mar-
ket competitiveness. Clear estimations of SEP control are 
difficult to make because of its opacity. However, serious 
attempts to assess the SEP race adjusting for over-declara-
tion show that the European Union is leading.
66   Jamie Davies, “Nokia, Ericsson and Huawei dominance beginning to fade – analyst,” telecoms.com, (August 04, 2020):  
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Biden-s-Asia-policy/US-and-allies-to-build-China-free-tech-supply-chain (accessed March 01, 2021). 
67   Matthew Noble et al.,”How to tell who’s winning at 5G - and why all reports are not equal,” iam, (May 28, 2019): 
https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/5g-seps-part-one  (accessed March 01, 2021).
68   Ericsson, “Ericsson a key player in EU drive to develop 6G multi-antenna technologies” (Jan 25, 2021): https://www.ericsson.com/en/news/2021/1/ericsson-in-eu-6g-drive 
(accessed March 01, 2021); Scott Moritz, “Nokia Leads a 6G Wireless Project for European Union,” Bloomberg, (December 7, 2020):  
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-07/nokia-will-lead-a-6g-wireless-network-project-for-european-union (accessed March 01, 2021).
69   European Commission, “Europe puts forward proposal for Joint Undertaking on Smart Networks and Services towards 6G”, (February 23, 2021):  
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/europe-puts-forward-proposal-joint-undertaking-smart-networks-and-services-towards-6g (accessed March 01, 2021).
70   The Federal Ministry of Education and Research, “Karliczek: 6G wird unsere Kommunikation revolutionieren - rund 700 Millionen Euro für die Vernetzungstechnologie von 
übermorgen“ [“Karliczek: 6G will revolutionize our communication - around 700 million euros for the network technology of the day after tomorrow”], (April 12, 2021): 
https://www.bmbf.de/de/karliczek-6g-wird-unsere-kommunikation-revolutionieren-rund-700-millionen-euro-fuer-die-14195.html?utm_source=hootsuite  
(accessed April 12, 2021).
Still, Huawei’s pressure on Ericsson and Nokia is intense, 
and motivated by the singular goal of grabbing mobile infra-
structure market share in Europe by using massive amounts 
of state aid, price dumping, and political strong-arming by 
the Chinese government.
As 5G is being rolled out, market players are already work-
ing on strategic positioning for the next generation of mo-
bile networks – 6G. With their patent leadership and strong 
market share both at home and abroad, European compa-
nies are currently well positioned in this regard with Erics-
son recently intensifying its research and development and 
Nokia steering the EU-funded 6G wireless project called 
Hexa-X.68 With the proposal for a strategic European part-
nership for the Smart Networks and Services Joint Under-
taking, the European Commission plans to spend up to 
€900 million for 6G research programmes and 5G develop-
ment over the budget period of 2021-2027.69 Furthermore, 
the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
launched the first German research initiative on 6G tech-
nology in April 2021 which provides €700 million for 6G re-
search until 2025.70 However, the international competition 
is fierce. Huawei already embarked on developing 6G in its 
research facilities in Ottowa, Canada, in 2019. This also mir-
rors the early engagement of Chinese state research pro-
grams in 5G development since around 2008. 
Current Policy Approach
5G will lay at the heart of countries’ digital infrastructures 
and assume central importance for further economic com-
petitiveness, since the existence of 5G enables further 
technological innovations such as the Internet of Things 
or autonomous vehicles. Political decision-makers them-
selves have been increasingly confronted with questions 
on 5G equipment sourcing, with particular concerns re-
garding the threat of cyberespionage, dependencies, geo-
politically motivated service disruptions, and the support 
of Europe’s own players for the technology. Concretely, it 
boils down to whether Huawei – the Chinese telecom giant 
with an opaque governance structure and connective tissue 
with the Chinese Communist Party – should be an equip-
ment provider for Europe’s 5G infrastructure. The US has 
Source:  “Huawei strengthens leadership in RAN market,” Telecomelead, (December 7, 2020)
TABLE 6:  GLOBAL MARKET SHARE FOR 5G RADIO ACCESS 
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tried to pressure its European allies to exclude Huawei from 
Europe, including attempts to gain partnership for its Clean 
Network Initiative. In Central Europe, the 17+1 format pro-
vides a case study of divergent positioning within Europe. 
Countries like Poland and the Baltic states have deep secu-
rity ties to the US and have come under considerable pres-
sure to ban Chinese equipment providers. While others, 
like Hungary have been more open to Chinese connectivi-
ty and tech infrastructure. Greece has tried to strike a del-
icate balance between the US and China on Huawei in light 
of the changing security landscape in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean. It agreed to the American 5G Clean Network, but 
it remains unclear whether or not they would deem Hua-
wei an untrustworthy provider.71 In total, 11 NATO members 
have not signed the Clean Network Initiative.72 
The EU has been striving for a coordinated approach among 
its members. In March 2019, the European Commission, on 
the request of the European Council, proposed that member 
states should exchange 5G risk information with each oth-
er and the European Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). The 
result of this information sharing was an EU risk assessment 
report released in October 2019, which provides a compre-
71   Eliza Gkritsi, “Huawei in Greece: How Snowden shaped EU’s approach to Huawei,” technode, (January 21, 2021): https://t.co/VpXgtssfEm?amp=1  (accessed March 01, 2021).
72   Florence Gaub, “What if…not? The cost of inaction”, EUISS, (January 2021): https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/CP_163.pdf (accessed April 07, 2021).
hensive list of cybersecurity risks from 5G networks. The re-
port also puts emphasis on risks stemming from individual 
vendors originating from non-EU countries: a clear reference 
to Huawei without explicitly naming the Chinese company. 
Building on this, the European Commission published the 
non-binding paper called “Cybersecurity of 5G networks – 
EU Toolbox of risk mitigating measures” – a how-to guide 
for dealing with specific vendors. The Toolbox contains 
content, explaining the potential risk stemming from ven-
dors such as Huawei and ZTE without naming explictly the 
Chinese companies. For instance, the toolbox calls on EU 
member states to take into account, as part of their as-
sessments, the problem posed by state interference via so-
called “high risk suppliers” and consider the possibility of 
restricting or even excluding suppliers from sensitive parts 
of core network based on their risk profile. It also promotes 
a multi-vendor strategy to avoid over-reliance on a single 
supplier. Beyond concrete aspects relating to risk, the Tool-
box makes the case for leveraging procurement and funding 
to strengthen Europe’s domestic industrial capacity. Hence, 
the European Commission acknowledges the importance of 
maintaining Europe´s comparatively strong market position 
FIGURE 18:  ASSIGNING 5G DECRLARED PATENT FAMILIES TO COUNTRIES/REGIONS PUTS THE EUROPEAN UNION  
IN THE LEAD WHEN ESSENTIALLY AND JURISDICITION QUALITY FILTERS ARE APPLIED
5G declared patent families were assigned to 
countries/regions using the headquarters location 
of the company which owned the relevant patent 










Source: Richard Vary and Matthew Noble, “Who is leading 5G development? 2020 update,” twoBirds Pattern (September 2020)
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in mobile technology, but also the relevance of creating a 
first-mover advantage in 6G – the next cellular mobile com-
munications development.
Both the EU’s Risk Assessment Report and the 5G Toolbox 
attempt to achieve a coordinated approach among member 
states in a field in which the EU’s decision-making power is 
limited. For instance, the EU’s cyber frameworks – the NIS Di-
rective and the Cybersecurity Act to protect electronic com-
munications networks – have limited competencies in terms 
of telecommunication networks. Even though the choice of 
whether to exclude Huawei from the 5G infrastructure is still 
pending in several member states, different models of market 
and network access seem to be evolving (see Fig. 19). Some 
countries, including Sweden and many Eastern and Central 
European states, are opting for a complete exclusion of Hua-
wei in near- or medium-term, whereas some Southern Euro-
pean countries such as Spain or Portugal seem to favor fewer 
restrictions. Another model could involve a partial ban and 
73 Namely the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the Federal Network Agency (BNetzA).
74  Security Research & Consulting GmbH, “IT Security Act 2.0 passed by the cabinet”, SRC, https://src-gmbh.de/en/it-sicherheitsgesetz-2-0-vom-kabinett-verabschiedet 
(accessed April 07, 2021).
restriction of Huawei from just the core network. The British 
government’s Huawei U-Turn – from a partial to a complete 
ban of Huawei in the beginning of 2020 – has probably had a 
signaling effect for other countries as well.
Germany’s debate about Huawei encapsulates the difficul-
ty and complexity of the decision. Initially in October 2019, 
two technical agencies73 released a security catalogue on 
behalf of the German government, which ruled that the de-
cision over 5G should be a purely technical one. In the af-
termath, several members of the Bundestag, including from 
within the ruling coalition parties, and federal intelligence 
agencies protested against this approach. After a long de-
liberation process, the upcoming IT Security Act 2.0 should 
now comprise the necessary regulations concerning tech-
nical and political considerations for 5G vendors.74 However, 
the law is likely to enter into force in the later part of 2021 
after much of the 5G equipment sourcing and infrastruc-
ture rollout has already taken place. 
FIGURE 19:  HUAWEI DECISION AMONG SELECTED MEMBER STATES: TO BAN OT TO BAN?
SPAIN 
There is no ban against Huawei  and Spanish 
operator Telefonica has already started  to 
deploy 5G equipment of the Chinese vendor in  
the country.
GERMANY
The upcoming IT Security Law 2.0 will 
comprise a technical assessment as well as a 
‘political assessment’ of the trustworthiness 
of manufacturers which may pave the way of 
excluding Huawei from the 5G network.
FRANCE 
Defacto preferential treatment of European 
vendors Telecoms operators will only be able to 
get licenses for buying Huawei equipment limited 
up to eight years and Huawei’s 5G technologies 
will be restricted to only non-sensitive areas.  
Defacto ban of Huawei after 2028.
CZECH REPUBLIC, ESTONIA, LITHUANIA,  
POLAND, SLOVENIA
Those countries have signed memorandum of 
understandings with the US stating that, among 
others, 5G suppliers would not be subject, 
without independent judicial review, to control 
by a foreign government and have transparent 
ownership, partnerships, and corporate 
goverance structures. Basically, paving the way 
for Huawei ban.
SWEDEN 
After an assessment of potential 5G vendors 
by the countries’ armed forces and security 
services, Huawei/ZTE will be banned from its 
5G networks and already installed equipment 






Source:  Own work
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The internet is predominantly built upon an open architec-
ture, which allows products of different vendors to commu-
nicate with each other and in turn network the world. The 
5G standard itself is open in principle, too. The infrastruc-
ture delivering 5G, however, is not. Infrastructure compa-
nies have each developed their own standards, which are 
like the Open RAN (O-RAN) Alliance,75 an industry-driv-
en group founded in February 2018 by mobile operators to 
promote new open interfaces and standards, shows. O-RAN 
could effectively decouple the software and hardware com-
ponents in non-core 5G equipment breaking oligopolistic 
control over the technology by a small set of vendors and 
allowing for more flexibility and transparency in securi-
ty specifications as well as easier upgrades. Support for this 
open software standard mainly originates in the US, which 
(unlike Europe and China) has no significant market player 
that benefits from a closed ecosystem.76 According to fore-
casts, Open RAN is likely to produce about €2.7 billion in an-
nual revenues by 2024 (in contrast to €59 million in 2019).77 
Besides this trend, the virtualization of network services is 
increasingly evolving and tech companies such as Amazon 
Web Services have already started to offer products in form 
of cloud-based 5G networks.78 If this market trend gains mo-
mentum – and performance and cyber security issues are 
addressed – maintenance and operating costs can be re-
duced and the potential price advantages current market 
leaders such as Huawei benefit from, will be reduced.
Recommendations
Communications infrastructure is essential for a free and 
democratic society. And any potential threat to it is also a 
threat to Europe’s democratic foundations. Europe should 
not risk compromising its security and should strive for a 
coordinated approach. The EU should maintain and further 
expand its strong position concerning 5G, which should 
pave the way for also assuming a leading position in 6G 
technology. Here are some actions the EU could take now 
to protect itself and strengthen its position on 5G:
75 See the O-RAN site for more information: https://www.o-ran.org (accessed April 07, 2021).  
76  James Sanders, “Huawei starting 6G research in Canada, where it faces prospect of 5G ban,” TechRepublic, August 16, 2019: https://www.techrepublic.com/article/huawei-
starting-6g-research-in-canada-where-it-faces-prospect-of-5g-ban (accessed March 01, 2021); Ericson and Nokia have also already started to research 6G capacities.
77  Alan Weissberger, “Omdia and Dell’Oro Group increase Open RAN forecasts,” IEEE ComSoc, (December 4, 2020):  
https://techblog.comsoc.org/2020/12/04/omdia-and-delloro-group-increase-open-ran-forecasts (accessed March 01, 2021). 
78  Telefonica, “Telefónica Germany / O2 builds new 5G core network in the cloud”, (September 01, 2020): https://www.telefonica.de/news/
press-releases-telefonica-germany/2020/09/cooperation-with-amazon-web-services-and-ericsson-drives-new-industrial-5g-solutions-telefonica-deutschland-o2-
builds-its-new-5g-core-network-in-the-cloud.html> (accessed March 17, 2021).
1. Look for ways to tighten the EU’s coordinated approach: 
The EU should further push for a concerted approach to 
avoid fragmentation within the EU and to learn from the 
initial roll-out and its effects. The new EU Cyber Securi-
ty Strategy goes in the right direction by insisting on the 
implementation of the 5G Toolbox in each EU member 
state by the second quarter of 2021. The NIS Cooperation 
Group should produce risk assessments to permanent-
ly evaluate potential risks and experiences from member 
states with 5G equipment from different vendors. The 
upcoming set up of the Joint Cyber Unit at the EU lev-
el or EU INTCEN could be used to collect the necessary 
information. The political assessment of the involvement 
of Chinese vendors must be further increased on EU lev-
el in a coordinated fashion (e.g. via constant meetings in 
the context of the Council of the European Union and 
its working groups). This should also help like-minded 
countries communicate about 5G issues with one voice, 
mitigating any political rifts among member states.
2. Support open standards: In order to provide a consis-
tent approach across technological areas, the EU should 
promote open standards for mobile communication net-
works. While this might weaken the position of major EU 
players compared to the US, it will strengthen the EU 
compared to China and enable more competition, ulti-
mately leading to more efficient mobile networking in 
the EU as well. By supporting initiatives like the O-RAN 
Alliance, the current vendor-specific debate regarding 
5G deployment might be avoidable for 6G.
3. Maintain 5G strengths while investing in 6G: Closely 
monitor the market to see which of the technologies 5G 
promised to enable are ultimately flourishing. It is im-
portant to assess industrial applications, expectations 
versus reality, and the potential for future growth. As 6G 
is being developed, the EU should lend support via its in-
novations programs and already start to develop a coor-
dinated (and early) approach to 6G standard-setting.
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Quantum computing is still in its infancy and commercial 
applications are limited. The field is in the incubation phase 
in academic and non-commercial research with expected 
development of full-scale error-corrected quantum com-
puters more than a decade away.79 Once matured, however, 
it is sure to be a major disruptive force in the tech market 
and an important geo-economic and security tool. Quan-
tum computers employ the principles of quantum physics 
for extraordinarily efficient parallel computing, which in 
turn can revolutionize many fields from AI to chemical sim-
ulation to communication and encryption. In 2019, the total 
quantum computing market size was just about €500 mil-
lion but it is expected to grow to about €65 billion in 2030 
as the technology matures.80
Europe and the US are the current leaders in quantum in-
vestment and research,81 hosting key quantum research 
79  Riken, “Wiring a new path to scalable quantum computing,” PHYS.ORG, (July 3, 2020):  
https://phys.org/news/2020-07-wiring-path-scalable-quantum.html (accessed March 01, 2021).
80  Prescient & Strategic Intelligence Private Limited, “2020. Quantum Computing Market is poised to surpass $64,988.3 Million by 2030: P&S Intelligence”, (February 10, 2020): 
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/02/10/1982087/0/en/Quantum-Computing-Market-is-Poised-to-Surpass-64-988-3-Million-By-2030-P-S-
Intelligence.html (accessed March 17, 2021).
81  “Global Quantum Computing Market Research Report – Industry Share, Growth, Drivers, Trends and Demand Forecast to 2030,” Business Wire, April 8, 2020: 
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/global-quantum-computing-market-research-095900153.html (accessed March 01, 2021).
82  Zandonella, C., “2019. Princeton announces initiative to propel innovations in quantum science and technology”, (September 25, 2019):  
https://www.princeton.edu/news/2019/09/25/princeton-announces-initiative-propel-innovations-quantum-science-and-technology (accessed March 01, 2021).
83  Julie Bort, “Have you ever wanted to try a quantum computer? Now you can,”, Business Insider, (May 4, 2016): 
https://www.businessinsider.com/ibm-launches-first-quantum-computer-cloud-service-2016-5?r=DE&IR=T (accessed March 01, 2021).
84  Frauenhofer, “IBM and Fraunhofer team up to promote quantum computing in Europe”, (September 12, 2019):  
https://www.fraunhofer.de/en/press/research-news/2019/september/ibm-and-fraunhofer-team-up-to-promote-quantum-computing-in-europe.html (accessed March 01, 2021).
85  Frank Arute et al., “Quantum supremacy using a programmable superconducting processor,” nature, (October 23, 2019):  
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1666-5 (accessed March 01, 2021).
groups. American quantum research groups have a long tra-
dition of working with major American tech companies (e.g. 
Princeton82 and Yale83 working with IBM, which is one of the 
leading companies in quantum computing today).
Drawing on the US public-private partnership tradition as 
a model, Germany’s Fraunhofer Institut – like Princeton 
and Yale – cooperates with IBM. The partnership has seen 
IBM install the Q System One quantum computer in Ger-
many, the first of its type in Europe.84 With the dominance 
of US companies for quantum computing hardware it is 
not surprising that the Stakeholder Snapshot shows a high 
perceived dependency on the US in this field (41 percent 
believe EU is too dependent on external actors for quantum 
technology and 50.4 percent believe the EU is most depen-
dent on the US).  
The quantum computers that are currently deployed are 
only able to execute short algorithms and can solve on-
ly a very limited set of problems. Even achieving quantum 
supremacy85 – the ability to use quantum-physics-based 
TABLE 7:  SIGNIFICANT QUANTUM COMPUTING USE CASES 
AI and machine learning Quantum computing can offer significantly improved computational speed and lower  
resource cost for training AI through quick optimization of problem solving and  
significantly better parallel computing capabilities during the learning process.
Chemistry and materials Enabling new simulation methodologies, quantum computing can offer more precise  
simulations of chemical reactions, which will allow for progress in chemical and  
material sciences. Quantum algorithms in this field already exist and can be implemented 
once quantum computers become sufficiently large and reliable.
Financial industry Quantum computing enables faster simulations and optimization algorithms  
for more accurate and current pricing.
Mobility and smart cities Superior optimization through the use of quantum computing enables efficient planning  
of inter-city traffic and real-time operation of smart cities.
Supply chain, logistics and 
energy
Complex networks and optimization problems can be analyzed more efficiently using  
quantum computing, leading to more efficient energy grid usage that can potentially  
reduce the environmental impact of energy generation.
Source: Dr. Rosenkranz et al., “Taming Quantum Computers with High-Level Software Stacks”, d-fine, (July 2020)
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computing to solve computational problems that take tra-
ditional computers a very long time in a fraction of the time 
– currently only applies to a very limited set of problems 
with no practical applications.86 Nonetheless, opening ac-
cess to quantum computing to the public has enabled the 
development of a huge quantum computing community 
with over 200,000 users and over 200 published research 
papers,87 and has enabled the scientific community to start 
building software fit for quantum computers. There still are 
significant barriers to unlocking the disruptive potential of 
quantum computing. Simply scaling up existing quantum 
computing technologies is unlikely to be successful because 
fundamental questions of physics and engineering still need 
to be addressed.88 
Given its incumbent research, Europe is well-positioned to 
compete in the race for full-scale error-corrected quantum 
computers. However, Europe is held back by factors that al-
so plague it in other areas of technology: lack of public-pri-
vate partnerships, lack of commercialization of its research, 
lack of venture capital, and lack of innovation ecosystems.
With this new technology, both funding and research prow-
ess can change quickly, even on a yearly basis. In 2019, for 
example, breaking the trend of US funding dominance, 58 
percent of quantum venture capital funding went to Euro-
pean start-ups (e.g. UK’s Riverlane, Austria’s Alpine Quan-
86   Felix Knoke, “Dieser übermächtige Computer ist praktisch nutzlos” [“This superior computer is practically useless“], SPIEGEL Netzwelt, October 23, 2019:  
https://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/googles-quantenueberlegenheit-praktisch-nutzlos-a-1292904.html (accessed March 02, 2021).
87   “NUS Expands its Quantum Computing Efforts in Southeast Asia with IBM,”, PR Newswire, (April 9, 2020): 
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/nus-expands-quantum-computing-efforts-000000390.html (accessed April 14, 2020).
88   RIKEN, “Wiring a new path to scalable quantum computing,” PHYS.ORG, July 3, 2020:  
https://phys.org/news/2020-07-wiring-path-scalable-quantum.html (accessed March 02, 2021).
89  Atomico, “The State of European Tech 2019”, (2019): https://2019.stateofeuropeantech.com/chart/255-1016/ (accessed March 02, 2021).
90   Karen Kwon, “China Reaches New Milestone in Space-Based Quantum Communications,” Scientific American, (June 25, 2020):  
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/china-reaches-new-milestone-in-space-based-quantum-communications (accessed March 02, 2021).
tum Technologies, Finland’s IQm), compared to 32 percent 
in the US and 5 percent across Asia.89 Whether this is an ex-
ception or a trend that might continue and allow Europe to 
catch up, and whether those start-ups will be able to com-
pete with the dominant (primarily US) tech giants, remains 
to be seen. This hopeful perspective was also confirmed by 
the Stakeholder Snapshot, in which the majority (57 per-
cent) placed the EU as a peer in quantum technologies, al-
though a significant portion (37 percent) did see the EU in 
the category of risk management.
The field of quantum technologies is much bigger than 
quantum computing itself. Communication, sensors, simu-
lation, and AI can benefit from quantum technology as well, 
either through directly using quantum computers or lever-
aging different quantum effects altogether. China is cur-
rently pioneering secure quantum communication90 while 
Europe has a strong position in quantum sensors, which are 
expected to have major applications in medical sciences.
Current Policy Approach
The EU added quantum computing to its agenda at the end 
of the 1990s. Nevertheless, there is no white paper or offi-
cial clear-cut EU strategy yet. Considering the rather dis-
tant tangible effects of quantum technologies (for instance 
in comparison to AI or 5G), this is not surprising. However, 







Rest of world 8.1%
Source: Martino Travagnin, “Patent analysis of selected quantum technologies”, JRC Technical 
Reports, (2019): <https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/patent-analysis-selected-quantum-
technologies> (accessed August 20, 2020).
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the previous European Commission already stated the goal of 
becoming a world leader in quantum technologies91 and ma-
ny quantum projects have been funded as part of the Future 
and Emerging Technologies program within Horizon 2020.92
The EU has two major quantum projects: the Quantum 
Flagship and PlanQK. The Quantum Flagship scatters re-
sources over a wide area of possible quantum applications, 
although its funding is not sufficient to ensure excellence in 
particular fields. Its ambition hinges on translating its sci-
entific breakthroughs into commercialized applications.93 
PlanQK, on the other hand, is highly specialized and aims 
at providing a software ecosystem for quantum AI. Howev-
er, the project depends on quantum computing hardware, 
which Europe cannot provide on its own.
EU funding remains broad, unfocused, and somewhat 
thinly spread making it difficult to concentrate resourc-
es in the pursuit of building a quantum computer. But in-
91   For instance, Andrus Ansip, Commission Vice-President for the Digital Single Market, issued the statement in 2018:  
“Europe is determined to lead the development of quantum technologies worldwide.”
92   European Commission, “Future and Emerging Technologies”, (2020):  
https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/future-and-emerging-technologies (accessed March 02, 2021).
93   European Commission, “Quantum Technologies Flagship”, (November 5, 2020):  
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/policies/quantum-technologies-flagship> (accessed March 02, 2021).
94   “Emmanuel Macron, “Veut mettre la France dans le trio de tête mondial des technologies quantiques” Le Monde, (January 21, 2021): https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/
article/2021/01/21/emmanuel-macron-presente-un-plan-quantique-de-1-8-milliard-d-euros-sur-cinq-ans_6067037_823448.html (accessed March 02, 2021).
95   Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, “Munich Quantum Valley – a leap forward for quantum science and technology”, (January 12, 2021):  
https://www.mpg.de/16258573/munich-quantum-valley (accessed March 02, 2021).
96   Felix Knoke, “Dieser übermächtige Computer ist praktisch nutzlos” [„This superior computer is practically useless“], SPIEGEL Netzwelt, (October 23, 2019):  
https://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/googles-quantenueberlegenheit-praktisch-nutzlos-a-1292904.html (accessed March 02, 2021).
97   European Commission, “Europe’s Digital Decade: digital targets for 2030”, (March 9, 2021): 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/europes-digital-decade-digital-targets-2030 (accessed April 07, 2021).
98   U.S. Department of Energy, “U.S. Department of Energy Unveils Blueprint for the Quantum Internet at ‘Launch to the Future: Quantum Internet’ Event,” July 23, 2020: 
https://www.energy.gov/articles/us-department-energy-unveils-blueprint-quantum-internet-launch-future-quantum-internet (accessed March 02, 2021).
dividual  member states have taken action. Germany has 
committed €2 billion for building quantum computers and 
France has pledged €1.8 billion for quantum technologies. 
Both pledges are around twice the total expected fund-
ing of the entire European Quantum Flagship program.94 
Some regional governments are also increasing quantum 
investment. For instance, Bavaria’s €300 million Quantum 
Valley.95 Given that the breakthrough in quantum comput-
ing is probably a decade away, the investment represents 
a far-sighted bet on an unproven, somewhat experimental 
strategic technology.96
The goal to bolster the EU’s quantum computing capabilities 
is also reflected in the Digital Compass.97 However, the goal, 
as currently phrased, only envisions Europe having its first 
quantum computer by 2025 – something that the cooperation 
between IBM and Fraunhofer Institut has already provided. 
Even if this goal was to be expanded with quantum comput-
ing capabilities being provided by a European company, this is 
a low bar. By setting such a low target, the EU risks being left 
behind, just as it was in semiconductor production.
While Europe is trying to catch up to the US in quantum 
computing, other areas should not be neglected either. 
Since funding via the Quantum Flagship is spread rath-
er thinly, significant programs with specific goals from the 
US or China can leave Europe at a disadvantage. For exam-
ple, the US has recently started to take the lead in quan-
tum communication with the US Department of Energy’s 
program to create a global quantum communication net-
work – the Quantum Internet.98 If successful, the US could 
consolidate its dominance over international communi-
cation networks, which have started to diminish in recent 
years due to the push by China to decouple networks. Once 
again, the US is positioning itself to strengthen its geopo-
litical power by being the first to translate current research 
into products available to the market. If the US can provide 
a service the rest of the world depends on, it can strength-
en its capacity to act. Europe can learn from this example.
TABLE 9:  SHORT TERM IS RIGHT NOW TO A FEW YEARS, 
MEDIUM TERM IS ABOUT 3-7 YEARS, LONG TERM IS LONGER 
THAN THAT
Applications of  
quantum computing








Source: Own work based on Antonio Acín et al., “The quantum technologies roadmap:  
a European community view”, 2018 
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Recommendations
Quantum Computing is a chance for the EU to establish a 
lead in a new and quickly growing area of technology. The 
EU should take the following steps to set it on that path: 
1. Create an overarching quantum strategy focused on en-
abling development of technology: Current EU projects 
are spread too thin and, while they do cover a wide area 
of quantum technologies, do not cover quantum comput-
ing itself adequately. While recent national and region-
al quantum computing initiatives fill the gap in funding 
in EU projects, the EU needs to aim for a concerted ap-
proach instead of relying on national initiatives. The EU 
quantum strategy should not implement a pie cemeal ap-
proach. Instead, it should identify key areas in which ex-
cellence is possible and aim for global leadership in those 
key areas.
2. Enable public-private partnerships: The loss of com-
petitiveness in the area of semiconductors should serve 
as a warning and must not be repeated. Industry is al-
ready significantly driving quantum research and with-
out a strong industry base the EU will not be able to 
maintain its scientific edge. The EU has to make sure to 
enable private players – preferably SMEs and start-ups 
– to bring quantum research to market. The EU should 
make sure that its funding is paired with private invest-
ment and that commercial applications with a proven re-
al-world impact are incentivized.
3. Use the EU’s regulatory power to enable open standards 
for quantum computing: The technology is still matur-
ing, which is the ideal opportunity for the EU to ensure 
both interoperability and competitiveness. PlanQK is al-
ready pursuing this goal in the field of quantum AI and it 
should be expanded to other areas of quantum technology. 
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Conclusion
In her first statement in the European Parliament as pres-
ident of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen 
stated that “[i]t is not too late to achieve technological sov-
ereignty in some critical technology areas”,99 naming quan-
tum computing, artificial intelligence, blockchain, and critical 
chip technologies among them. The EU’s quest for mastery 
in all of the key enabling technology areas in this study will 
be difficult in the medium-term. Europe’s “catch up” posi-
tion vis-à-vis the US and China clearly shows that the EU and 
its member states need to adopt a sophisticated approach to 
enhance their capacity to act in the technological realm.
Europe’s goal should be to increase its technological capa-
bilities as far as possible while avoiding or mitigating against 
over-dependencies on third-countries or competitor powers 
such as the US and China.
4.1 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
There is one central aspect necessary to strengthen Eu-
rope’s capacity to act in the technological realm, which spans 
across all sectors: Fostering a culture of innovation where 
digital companies and start-ups can thrive. The EU should 
consider the following recommendations if it wants to re-
main competitive and grow the reputation of Europe as a 
place of technological progress:
1. Nurture a high-skilled workforce through flexible 
working conditions, education, and immigration: Mak-
ing advances in technology requires access to a skilled 
and flexible work force. Not just technical expertise but 
also adaptability, creativity, critical thinking, and willing-
ness to learn – not just in school or university but also in 
all aspects of life.100 Focusing parts of the educational sys-
tem on technologies and building valuable skills into the 
workforce is necessary if Europe wants to have an effec-
tive long-term strategy. The Digital Compass 2030 con-
tains some targets in that direction (e.g. 80 percent of 
all adults in the EU should have basic digital skills, plus 
20 million should become ICT specialists in the EU un-
til 2030), but these targets have to become more precise.
99  Maria Chiara Morandini et al., “Facing the Digital Transformation: are Digital Skills Enough?”, European Commission, (July 08, 2020): 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/facing-digital-transformation-are-digital-skills-enough_en (accessed March 02, 2021).
100  Ibid.
2. Remove roadblocks to the use of innovative technolo-
gies: Completing the EU’s digital single market is central 
to a competitive European tech base. The EU’s tenden-
cy to be a  “first mover” in regulation puts additional bur-
dens on European companies, which can making it harder 
to bring innovation to the market. Finding a balance that 
preserves European values but supports innovation is es-
sential if the EU wants to become globally competitive, 
especially considering how quickly China can build and 
prototype, while worrying much less about regulation.
3. Develop a deeper culture of risk tolerance: About 90 
percent of start-ups in Silicon Valley fail. Still, Silicon 
Valley currently is the world’s center of innovation with 
regard to new technologies. The EU should support the 
creation of a tech community of researchers and entre-
preneurs in which people are encouraged to take risks 
and supported if they fail.
4.2  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EUROPE’S 
TECHNOLOGY FOREIGN POLICY 
Politically, and especially in terms of the technological clash 
between the US and China, the EU and its member states 
have to ground their tech policy in a way that preserves Eu-
ropean independence, resilience and values:
1. Maintain a globally open Internet and innovation eco-
system: The EU and its member states should promote 
the merits of global innovation. However, it will be a del-
icate balancing act to do so since, in some instances, the 
EU has to address the practices of the US (e.g. in terms 
of taxation of US tech companies, market power of plat-
forms, privacy and content moderation) and China (e.g. by 
potentially excluding Huawei technologies on national se-
curity grounds, being mindful of data protection and da-
ta localization, attempts of introducing a Huawei-backed 
New Internet Protocol and guarding against cyber IP theft, 
the use of repressive technology, and how it is exported 
to other countries). In that context, it will be important 
that the EU clearly signals that it preserves an open inter-
net environment and innovation ecosystem that serves its 
own strategic, political, security and economic interests.
2. Develop and lead international coalitions with 
like-minded actors in standard-setting bodies and 
technology governance: It will be crucial for the EU to 
work with like-minded states to ensure that a semblance 
of the multilateral order can be maintained, and access to 
key technologies, even if not produced in Europe, is se-
Europe’s Capacity to Act in the Global Tech Race
40 No. 6 | April 2021
REPORT
cured. The EU’s Digital Compass proposes a format for 
“inclusive multilateralism” that can promote a global tech 
order in an “open but assertive manner, based on Euro-
pean values.”101 As perhaps the world’s leading convening 
power, the EU should help lead in new informal group-
ings as part of an effort to shape the global digital mar-
ket and push back against authoritarian tech governance. 
The EU and its member states could also form the core 
– along with the US, UK, South Korea, Japan and others 
– for democratic caucuses in standard-setting bodies like 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 
on cybersecurity norms, on Internet governance, and in 
joint strategies on connectivity in the Global South. To-
gether, they can make technology adoption and emissions 
targets mutually reinforcing through standards and incen-
tives that operate globally. This effort should start with 
cross-cutting strategic engagement with the US through 
a new EU-US Trade and Technology Council that ties both 
parties together on values, market access, tech gover-
nance, and industrial policy. 
3. Incorporate the Global South into a strategy that fu-
els development, connectivity and regional empower-
ment. Competition for tech dominance is increasingly 
being waged in the Global South where “tech takers” in 
areas like AI, 5G, and payment systems come under the 
sway of systems developed in Silicon Valley and in China. 
Third country tech adoption and standard-setting in ar-
eas like 5G and mobile payments can create path depen-
dencies that lead to the emergence of digital spheres of 
influence. The EU should work with countries in the de-
veloping world and like-minded states to link connectivity, 
digital infrastructure, and development in a way that pro-
vides a democratic answer to China’s Belt and Road Ini-
tiative, gives local communities more ownership of their 
digital futures, and seeks to address the UN’s sustainable 
development goals (SDGs). The EU’s Connectivity Strategy, 
tech diplomacy, regional dialogues and newly announced 
Digital Connectivity Fund can help create conditions that 
favor greater competition and preserve European values 
in the Global South.102
4. Address the role that military and defense moderniza-
tion can play in advancing Europe’s innovation indus-
trial base. Even though this issue has not been tackled 
predominantly in this report, the EU and its member 
states must start a fact-based examination on the ethi-
cal development and usage of emerging, disruptive tech-
nologies in military contexts – both as a component of 
technological innovation and as a key to building a ca-
pable and future-ready armed forces. The US and Chi-
101  “2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade”, (March 09, 2021):  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:12e835e2-81af-11eb-9ac9-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF (accessed April 07, 2021).
102 Ibid.
na are actively leveraging the dual use of technologies 
for their militaries. Since the Obama Administration, the 
Pentagon has worked assiduously to create cooperation 
between Silicon Valley and the US military through pro-
grams like the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), the Joint 
Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), and expert commis-
sions like the National Security Commission on Artificial 
Intelligence (NSCAI). Most European states have yet to 
catch up and examine how emerging tech should be de-
veloped and deployed in their militaries. The EU should 
push for a Europe-driven initiative on how to bridge the 
technology objectives of NATO, the EU, and individual 
member states. This conversation must extend beyond 
arms control and lethal autonomous weapons systems to 
address joint operational and ethical codes of conduct. 
Member states and EU institutions, such as the European 
Defence Agency (EDA), must find a way to integrate Eu-
rope’s innovative technologies.
To enhance the EU’s capacity to act on the global stage, the 
bloc and its member states must be able to promote the 
human-centered approach beyond Europe. A cohesive, in-
tegrated EU approach to technology on the international 
stage should be shaped in tandem with efforts to rethink 
the bloc’s relations with China. 
The Stakeholder Snapshot shows that China is expected to 
take global leadership in artificial intelligence and semicon-
ductor production by 2030 in addition to leading in mobile 
equipment, and China has become more belligerent during 
the COVID-19 crisis. Its disinformation campaigns, data 
theft and cyberattacks on European infrastructure have be-
come more brazen amid the COVID-19 crisis. Digital crack-
downs and mass surveillance have become the instruments 
of oppression from Hong Kong to Xinjiang. And China has 
shown it is willing to play hardball to force Europeans to ac-
cept Huawei equipment in its 5G infrastructure. Ursula Von 
der Leyen’s calling out of Chinese cyberattacks on EU hos-
pitals during the COVID-19 crisis, the March 2021 EU sanc-
tions against four Chinese officials over Xinjiang abuses, and 
invocation of the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox against foreign 
actors for the first time last year are steps in the right di-
rection. But the EU should work to marshal a more effective 
partner-based opposition while at the same time recognizing 
that China’s existence is a permanent economic reality and 
one to which Europe’s export capacity is increasingly tied.
The EU and its member states should also avoid fueling the 
trend of digital decoupling while at the same time promot-
ing the merits of an open, human-centric innovation sys-
tem. Pulling together the various strands that make up the 
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EU’s tech policy together into one concerted EU effort will 
be a delicate undertaking. By integrating the tools of tech 
diplomacy, development, industrial policy, regulation, and 
values into a coherent identity, the EU will be better po-
sitioned to promote democratic tech and check the tech-
no-authoritarianism. If that effort works, the EU can have 
a leading stake in building a global digital order based on 
openness, dynamism, innovation, and value creation with-
in the EU. And in doing so, it can create a marketplace that 
guarantees wide access while protecting users’ rights, 
security, and the principles of democracy that lie at the 
heart of the European system.
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